China’s public humility drive: Are you watching, Mr Zuma?

No fear No Favour No lies........



Simon Allison            SOUTH AFRICA    24 APRIL 2013  12:06

Every few years, all Chinese senior officers will have to do a two-week stint as a lowly private, as per a new presidential directive. This, apparently, is the prevention and the cure for “laziness, lax discipline, extravagance and other bureaucratic illnesses”. Sounds like something South Africa could learn from. By SIMON ALLISON.

As China’s overall wealth has increased, dramatically over the past couple of decades, so has the wealth gap – and the feeling that the men and women who inhabit the upper echelons of Chinese society, be they party leaders, government officials, business tycoons or some combination thereof, are increasingly out of touch with everyday life in China, which is still by and large a poor country.
This can be a dangerous, destabilising sentiment, and so China’s leaders are looking for ways to show that they remain humble and down-to-earth and just like the rest of the hard-working proletariat. That’s why the story last week of President Xi Jinping hopping into a Beijing taxi caused such a stir – and generated a lot of goodwill towards the new head of state. The story showed Xi doing a normal, everyday kind of thing, stripped of the pomp and ceremony which normally accompanies his every movement. If he’s willing to go without his limousines and official escort and brave Beijing traffic just like every other commuter then surely he’s not too divorced from realities. Just a pity, then, that the story turned out to be false.
That’s alright, because Xi’s got other plans to make sure his administration does not project too haughty an image. He’s already ordered public officials to cut down on extravagant public spending. As the New York Times wrote:
“Warning that graft and gluttony threaten to bring down the ruling Communists, Mr Xi has ordered an end to boozy, taxpayer-financed banquets and the bribery that often takes the form of a gift-wrapped Louis Vuitton bag. Gone, for now, are the freshly cut flowers and red-carpet ceremonies that used to greet visiting dignitaries. This month, military officers who arrived here for the annual National People’s Congress were instructed to share hotel rooms and bring their own toiletries. ‘Car-pooling feels so good because it provides a way to bond and chat with each other while saving money and increasing efficiency,’ one senior military official told the People’s Liberation Army newspaper.”
Car-pooling feels good indeed, but not nearly as good as President Xi’s latest directive to shrink the inequality gap. The South China Morning Post reported on Tuesday morning that, from now on, all Chinese generals and senior officers are going to have to shed their epaulettes and accompanying privileges for two week-long stints in the lowest ranks of the army. That’s right: all officers from the rank of lieutenant-colonel or above will have to spend at least a fortnight every few years as a lowly private.
The officers will have to live, eat, and serve with their foot soldiers during this period. “They need to provide for themselves and pay for their own food. They must not accept any banquet invitation, join any sight-seeing tours, accept gifts or interfere with local affairs,” said the directive, which was published on the website of the Ministry of National Defence.
This is in response to a popular – and not inaccurate – perception that a senior officer’s life is a cushy one. And it’s not unprecedented. In 1958, none other than Mao Zedong himself instituted a near-identical measure. The idea is that this ostentatious show of humility will promote unity within the ranks – and remind the pampered top brass of what it feels like to be at the very bottom of the hierarchy. “It will help to purify the soul and be the prevention and cure for laziness, lax discipline, extravagance and other bureaucratic illnesses,” commented the People’s Liberation Army Daily.
Whether this really is a panacea for all bureaucratic ills remains to be seen, but it is nonetheless significant that Xi has chosen the army on which to launch his public humility drive. It tells us two things: first, that the army remains the most important institution in China, still in many ways a role-model for the country as a whole and a guarantor of the one party state; and second, that Xi feels secure enough in power that he doesn’t feel the need to kowtow to his generals; instead, he can take some bold measures to keep them in line.
Given the South African leadership’s oft-expressed admiration for the Chinese model, and given our own notoriously wide income and inequality gaps, it’s worth pondering whether Xi’s very public attempts to address the symptoms of the problem might be followed in South Africa.
But given the concentration of power here, the Cabinet might make a better target than the army. What’s to stop President Jacob Zuma ordering Aaron Motsoaledi to don a pair of scrubs and help out as a hospital orderly for a few weeks? Susan Shabangu can go down a mine shaft (we suggest somewhere around Marikana), Tokyo Sexwale can lay some bricks and Naledi Pandor can try enforce queue discipline at the Harrison Street Home Affairs office in Johannesburg. If we’re really lucky, we’ll even see Fikile Mbalula go running.
It’s not a bad idea, actually. They’d learn a few things, and it would be a wonderful public relations coup for the government’s battered image. Maybe the Chinese model has a few things to recommend it after all. DM
Read more:
● Xi Jinping orders generals and senior officers to serve as privates onSouth China Morning Post
Photo: China's President Xi Jinping speaks during a meeting with representatives of entrepreneurs at the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) annual conference in Boao town, Hainan province April 8, 2013. REUTERS/Tyrone Siu

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Dzhokhar Tsarnaev: The Marathon (and ultimately a Mirandised) Man

daily maverick - Simon Allison

COMMENTS BY SONNY


Let's hope this sentiment can humble President Zuma and his cabinet.

If not, nothing will change and corruption will succeed to grow in South Afria.

Then the wealthy will steal more and the poor will remain in poverty.

The poor shall weep and the rich shall eat cake!

INGREDIENTS FOR A REVOLUTION!

SA fighting M23: What’s at stake?

No fear No Favour no loss of SA lives.........




 KHADIJA PATEL      south africa     23 april 2013  01:36

The Congolese rebel group has continued to warn of dire consequences if they are attacked by the newly-assembled United Nations intervention brigade. And if South African troops are indeed part of such an attack on M23, there could be hell to pay. By KHADIJA PATEL.

On Sunday, Congolese rebel group M23 announced that the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) had set up base in Muningi, some 5km from the eastern city of Goma and a trifling 100m from M23 positions. “Any time something bad can happen,” the group warned on Twitter, adding that they would re-invade Goma within two hours of a SANDF attack on their positions.

While some point out that when the group took Goma last November, purportedly with the full backing of Rwanda and Uganda, they never paused to tweet threats. They just went along and occupied Goma without too much bother, issuing a warning to the Joseph Kabila’s government in Kinshasa and the rest of the region as well.

Ten days after occupying the city, M23 withdrew from Goma on December 1 2012, with little explanation, leaving behind a trail of destruction and woe. The Congolese Red Cross counted at least 90 bodies in and around Goma and the Rutshuru territory, to the city’s north, after the withdrawal was completed.

After the rebels left, the Congolese government asserted a semblance of control over the city, while M23 lurk on the outskirts, mulling their options in negotiations with the Congolese government in Uganda.

A few months later, M23's Bosco Ntganda is at The Hague to face charges of crimes against humanity. But no one has claimed responsibility, or offered compensation to those caught in middle of the conflict. The focus of diplomatic efforts has been on stamping out the threat of M23 on Joseph Kabila’s government.

The talks have been fraught with breakdowns as both sides refuse to compromise their positions.

On 28 March, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 2098, which authorises three infantry battalions, one artillery and one Special Forces Company to be headquartered in Goma. The resolution “strongly condemns the continued presence of the M23 in the immediate vicinity of Goma and its attempts to establish an illegitimate parallel administration in North Kivu.”

But it’s not M23 alone that the UN resolution has named.

The text of the resolution targets the “increased activity of other armed groups, including the Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain (APCLS) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in North Kivu, the Mayi-Mayi Gedeon and the Mayi-Mayi Kata-katanga in Katanga Province, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Orientale Province”.

The eastern region of the DRC has long been the site of an unseemly tug-of-war between the state and rebel militia.

So while M23 is the most immediate target of the UN intervention brigade, combat in the region may prove to be more complex than a simple fight for territory between the UN and one group of rebels. There are at least a dozen rebel groups operating in the eastern DRC, all of whom could come into play in some way against the intervention brigade.

Indifference met the announcement in January of South Africa’s readiness to contribute troops to the United Nations brigade to combat rebel groups in the DRC. Certainly at the time it appeared to be the newest extension of an ambitious foreign policy with little impact on life at home. For all the championing of African solutions for African problems, the troubles of the rest of the region, never mind the continent, are often too far removed from the South African everyday to inspire more than a passing interest in the latest episode of an old conflict.

The events in CAR last month reminded South Africans that the deployment of South African troops risks the lives of South African troops – and the minister of defence has said that casualties suffered by the SANDF in combat are the collective responsibility of the South African population.

“We as a country fully take responsibility for the death of your children. But we don’t regret sending them,” Mapisa-Nqakula said last month to the bereaved families of soldiers who had died in Bangui. “Painful as it may be, know that your children died fighting. I say this in all sincerity, without any arrogance.”

She stressed then that the losses incurred by the SANDF in CAR would not be a deterrent to future deployments.

And despite warnings of a massacre from M23, the SANDF has not been cowed from its deployment to the DRC.

“The SANDF and its members are not going to be scared by anything. We vowed and took oaths to serve the country even if there’s a need for us to die. Whatever task the government gives us will be taken with high morale and high spirits,” SANDF spokesperson Xolani Mabanga said last week.

As with CAR, however, South Africa’s willingness to offer military help in the DRC has prompted speculation of a more dubious intent behind the SANDF’s latest mission in the eastern Congo. 

Suspicion surrounding South Africa’s involvement in the DRC is not new. It is, after all, through its peace-brokering efforts that South Africa was able to brand itself as an African peacemaker. South Africa invested heavily in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue held at Sun City in February 2002, but this mediation effort was suspected to have been coloured by self-interest. South Africa has contributed peacekeeping troops, committed to the development of the DRC’s public sector, and invested millions of rands and years of diplomacy to bring stability to the DRC - the R126 million spent to assist the DRC with its election in 2011 is one such example.

This particular interest in the DRC has long been suspected of being a guise for securing lucrative opportunities for South African businesses. 

In 2010, President Kabila set off a legal dispute between a leading European oil firm and Khulubuse Zuma, after he awarded two exploration blocks to companies owned by President Jacob Zuma’s nephew. Kabila’s government had previously allocated exploration rights to Irish oil major Tullow and South Africa's Divine Inspiration Group.

While Khulubuse has shrugged off suggestions Zuma was personally involved in the “smash and grab”, South African diplomacy in the DRC does certainly aid such deals.

A core tenet of South Africa’s foreign policy is to open African markets for South African goods and services. In the DRC, South Africa has fared very well in this regard. Two-way trade between South Africa and the DRC was R7.8 billion in 2011, up from R6.2 billion in 2010 and R4.8 billion in 2009. 

Those numbers, however, may stand for nothing in the coming months when South African troops face off rebels in the eastern Congo. And a South African-steered attack on the rebels may be especially costly.  DM

Read more:

• South African troops fighting M23: It’s not all about us in Daily Maverick

Photo: M23 rebel fighters guard the venue of a news conference in Bunagana in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo January 3, 2013. REUTERS/James Akena.

DAILY MAVERICK  -  KHADIJA PATEL

African plans for Mali’s future in trouble after Chad’s shock withdrawal

SIMON ALLISON      south africa    23 april 2013     12:23

Chad was supposed to be the backbone of the African-led force in Mali. And, until now, that’s exactly what it has been, providing the only African soldiers trained and trusted for combat operations in the tricky desert war against experienced Islamist militants. Chad’s shock decision to withdraw its troops is therefore a serious setback. By SIMON ALLISON.

It’s taken a long time for the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (Afisma) to get off the ground. A very long time. The idea was first mooted in early 2012, as West African countries reacted to the sudden crisis in Mali; more than a year later, there may be some soldiers on the ground, but they are still receiving training from European Union specialists and few are trusted with combat operations.
There is an exception to this. The 2,000-strong contingent from Chad have won the respect of their highly-trained French counterparts with their conduct under fire, and plenty of praise from defence analysts who say that their experience fighting guerrilla rebels at home in similarly hot and difficult conditions make them the most dangerous fighters deployed by the international community in Mali.
Joining French troops after the initial French intervention which clawed back most major cities in the north from the Islamist rebels, Chadian soldiers were involved in the guerrilla campaign’s most significant battle to date, the battle of Isfoghas, where they took the fight to a rebel base in the Isfoghas mountains. Despite sustaining dozens of injuries and 23 deaths, Chad secured the area.
Chadian special forces have also been responsible for claiming the war’s most notable scalps: that of Abdelhamid Abou Zeid, a key commander of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the notorious militant thought to be responsible for the Algeria gas plant attack (Belmokhtar’s death has not been independently confirmed).
Chad is, in other words, holding up Africa’s end of the bargain when it comes to supporting the military intervention in Mali. But not for much longer.
In an unexpected announcement, Chad’s long-time President Idriss Deby told French reporters that his country would be recalling its contingent.
“Face-to-face fighting with the Islamists is over. The Chadian army does not have the skills to fight a shadowy, guerrilla-style war that is taking place in northern Mali,” said Deby. “Our soldiers will return to Chad. They have accomplished their mission. We have already withdrawn a mechanised battalion.”
Deby is being somewhat disingenuous. His army may not have the skills to fight a guerrilla-style war in northern Mali, but then few armies in history have distinguished themselves against guerrilla campaigns anywhere. For recent examples, just think of the US army in Iraq and Afghanistan. Fact is, Deby’s army is far more qualified than any of the other countries that are taking part in Afisma, including heavyweight Nigeria, which has a less than stellar record of dealing with militant groups at home (like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta or, currently, Boko Haram).
So what’s behind Deby’s decision to pull his troops? It’s hard to say, but a number of factors may come into play: domestic pressures, the situation in the Central African Republic (in which Chad is intimately involved), concern about the recent influx of 50,000 refugees from Darfur.
Whatever his motivation, the result is a big headache for Afisma, and an even bigger one for France which was hoping to pull out or at least withdraw from Mali in the near future. Without Chad’s 2,000 soldiers, this will be a lot more difficult to manage.

The decision also plays havoc with future plans for international involvement in Mali. The United Nations has been trying to come up with various ways of coordinating its longer-term response to the Malian situation, all of which fall broadly into two main options: sending a team to supplement and guide the Afisma operation, or evolving Afisma into a fully-fledged United Nations stabilisation mission along the lines of Monusco in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

All plans, however, revolve around Chad’s continued presence, says David Zounmenou, senior researcher with the Institute for Security Studies. “The UN plans to use Chad and the French as a backbone for any operations,” he told the Daily Maverick. Chad is also important politically, Zounmenou added, turning an essentially West African deployment into a continental one. “If we want to make this a West African problem we’re not going to resolve it, because it involves lots of countries that are around Mali in the Sahel – especially Algeria, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad, to a lesser extent. That’s why you see Chad deployed there; because they have combat forces that can take on this kind of challenge.”

Not any more – at least not for now. In his comments, President Deby did add that he would consider sending the troops in again once combat operations have wound down. While welcome, this falls far short of the kind of support Afisma and the United Nations were relying on, and means that all the international efforts aimed at fixing the Mali mess must go back to the drawing board. DM

Read more:

• Chad pulls its troops from Mali in the Guardian
• Who’s afraid of big bad Chad? on Daily Maverick

Photo: Chadian soldiers form a line with their armoured vehicles in the northeastern town of Kidal, Mali, February 7, 2013. Around 1,000 troops from Chad led by the president's son advanced towards the mountains of northeast Mali on Thursday to join French search-and-destroy operations hunting Islamist jihadists. REUTERS/Cheick Diouara

Daily Maverick   Simon Allison

comments by sonny

is the future of joseph kabila worth all this unnecessary slaughter of our sa troops?

will mali be zuma's third or fourth suicide mission into central africa?

WHEN CHAD WITHDRAWS FROM MALI IT WILL BE HELL FIRE IN THE WESTERN DESERT.....

DOES FIELD MARSHALL ZUMA WANT TO REPLAY THE BATTLES OF WWII IN THE WESTERN DESERT AS WELL?

WHERE IS THE SUDDEN CASH FLOW COMING FROM??

HOW MANY OF THESE 'LEADERS' WERE ELECTED IN FREE AND FAIR DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS?

THE ILLUMINATI?

Letter from Nigeria: The Niger River Delta looks at life after oil

No fear No Favour No Flooding please........



RICHARD POPLAK                                             south africa                        23 april 2013   12:36

This is Bayelsa State, heart of the Niger Delta, and “glory of all lands”, according to the official state tagline. Under the care of His Excellency the Honourable Seriake Dickson, what was once a restive kidnapping zone has mellowed considerably. But Nigeria’s oil-rich region still has some way to go before it reaches the New African Ideal: a knowledge economy overrun by tourists from the East carrying Louis Vuitton luggage sets and golfing under an equatorial sun. By RICHARD POPLAK.

Beware of Port Harcourt, for it is a sneaky place. It hides behind thick Lagosian accents as “Pathankot”, which happens to be a municipal dispensation in northern India I visited for a recent assignment. When the Nigerian Pathankot reveals itself as Port Harcourt, a glance at the map elicits a groan, especially when one’s final destination happens to be the city of Yenagoa, one state and a three-hour drive away, through what was once the heart of Nigeria’s oil-region troubles.
Thanks to a farrago of agreements, security ramp-ups and local regime changes, the Niger Delta no longer deserves its undiminished reputation as a kidnapping hotspot. The problem at hand is arguably more dangerous – the 70km of road that lies between the Port Harcourt airport and the Yenagoa State Cultural House, where I’m travelling with colleague and co-author Kevin Bloom to the African Movie Academy Awards. It is perhaps the oddest place in the continent for a glittering awards show, but Bayelsa has a historical link with Nollywood – natives form the bulk of the industry’s directors and technicians, and Governor Seriake Dickson has stars in his eyes. The awards ceremony is partly designed as a launch pad for several new programmes and development projects meant to wean Bayelsa from its crude addiction.
The Port Harcourt airport, like most airports in Africa, is under construction. We enter a parking lot through a series of air-conditioned tents, and find ourselves a driver who will take us through to Yenagoa for the equivalent of about $55 each. (This, on top of $230 one-way plane tickets from Lagos, makes for an expensive trip). The ride is spectacular, unmatchable, video-game worthy. It takes the passenger from River State to Bayelsa at roughly the speed of sound, along roads that range from perfectly paved to bombed-out moonscape – all of it framed by jungle so fecund that you can practically feel the fungus growing between your toes as the ride progresses. The Yenagoa road – and please keep in mind that this is the capital of one of the more oil-rich districts in the entire continent – is an emblem for how poorly the area has been managed, and how the drain of petroleum wealth has compromised Nigeria’s development. Crushed vehicles lie rotting in the roadside jungle, and the trucks and busses zooming at us head-on, with intent, suggest that were our driver to shift his attention to one of his two smartphones, the only thing that would save us is a band of rampaging kidnappers. For the most part, they are no more.
Bayelsa itself is the result of a controversial administrational revamp of the delta region that occurred in the mid-90s. The state dates back to 1996, and Goodluck Jonathan rose from governor to the presidency during a two-year tenure that kicked off in 2005. Jonathan considers the region home and it should be unsurprising that oil-soaked local elites hold such political sway in Abuja. Equally unsurprising is the fact that Bayelsa and its environs have always been considered the ground zero of Nigeria’s endemic rot. Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, an army hack who governed between 1999 and 2005, was found with £1 million in cash in his London home, a city in which he owned a further £10 million worth of property. Timipre Silva, the most recent incumbent, was removed due to a court order, following a suspected fallout with Jonathan. Now: the reign of Seriake Dickson, a Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) stalwart and a man firmly in the Jonathan orbit.
In the delta, it is difficult to do worse than one’s predecessors. The region’s principal threat, besides an enraged local population, the odd religious riot and occasionally violent political infighting, has been the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, or Mend. In association with the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force and other militant groups, Mend sought to harass foreign oil companies and their Nigerian backers in government, in order to end the exploitation and environmental degradation it claims has battered the region into penury. It routinely hit pipelines, barges and vehicles operated by international oil companies, battled the Nigerian army and kidnapped foreign workers. While the hostilities continue, and while Mend recently sent an email to Jonathan warning him that it would respond in kind to Muslim atrocities in the north, it has not done much to disrupt the new tenure of Seriake Dickson. (In a local aside, Henry Okah, the movement’s putative head, was arrested and tried in South Africa, and sentenced to 24 years in prison earlier this year).
Yenagoa is smeared over a flat plain of swampland, where individual properties occasionally abut a patch of pea soup-green goop that bubbles forth from the ground. There are a series of paved roads, and a broad boulevard that cuts through the town centre, but the rest of the city remains linked by sand road. The town’s defining feature is a twirling concrete structure that is the skeleton, or carcass, of an unfinished luxury hotel. No one seems to know when, or if, the hotel will be completed. In this context, Mend and its like appear entirely inevitable.
For his part, Dickson speaks the development game with the best of them. During his opening address at the African Movie Academy Awards he said, “We must prepare for the end of oil.” In this, “we will not be deterred by the high cost involved in building new infrastructure.” He plans roads, an airport in Yenagoa, several new luxury hotels, and a PGA-level golf course. “We plan to make this a destination where tourists will be happy to visit.” The sentiments are fine ones. But while the golf course is underway, it is difficult to grasp how this will benefit a local population that desperately needs schools, clinics and basic infrastructure in order to nudge communities into the future. The misalignment of priorities comes at a time when international oil companies are gently making way for local outfits, which are more community centric in their approach. Things are changing for the better, but at a rate that is far too slow to keep groups like Mend from proliferating. To see kids scrabbling in the dirt here is simply inexcusable.
In Bayelsa, like everywhere else in Nigeria, the traveller feels the incontrovertible local truth: the country is at a tipping point, if it hasn’t tipped already. Educated Nigerians no longer see dysfunction as an embarrassment to be drowned by good Cognac in a London wine bar, but an opportunity to be exploited. The country is open for business, and while the challenges remain – see: road from Port Harcourt to Yenagoa – the smart consultant has to be insane to ignore the joint. The awful reputation the country has engendered, especially in South Africa, needs to be put aside. Nigeria is a numbers game, and the numbers are firmly on its side.
The drive back to Port Harcourt is no less invigorating than the first installment. Here and there, the signs of a new carriageway can be seen. After a battle at the airport with Arik Airways, and a last-minute ticket purchase, back we go to Lagos. The plane is full. The roads are full. The future is full. But it remains the future. Nigerians still have their share of work to do in the present. DM
Photo: Children stand in front of a stilt house used as a local fuel station near river Nun in Nigeria's oil state of Bayelsa November 27, 2012. Despite billions of dollars worth of oil flowing out of Nigeria South East, life for the majority of Niger Delta's inhabitants remains unchanged. Most people live in modest iron-roofed shacks, and rely on farming or fishing, their only interaction with the oil industry being when they step over pipelines in the swamps – or when a spill blights their landscape. REUTERS/Akintunde Akinleye

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Boko Haram and Nigeria: No good guys here

DAILY MAVERICK

  

COMMENTS BY SONNY

South African SQUATTERS WHO BUILD THERE SHACKS ON THE WETLAND SHOULD TAKER NOTE OF HOW THINGS ARE DONE IN THE nIGER RIVER DELTA.........

It may prevent them of having their "homes flooded' in the rainy seasons.

kliptown and alexandra are good examples of the floodings...........

OKAY, THERE IS ONLY USED OIL IN JOHANNESBURG..............

In Pretoria: chasing army reports, rumours and a rumpus on CAR

No Fear No Favour No Suicidal missions please.........

Khadija Patel South Africa                                      22 April 2013 01:52

 The capital is awash with rumours about the comings and goings of the South African National Defence Force. KHADIJA PATEL tracked one of these rumours – regarding the whereabouts of some missing military assets – around Pretoria.



 As the headquarters of the South African National Defence Force, Pretoria is awash with rumours about the comings and goings of the country’s armed forces. Much of the information is supposed to be secret, but then, this is Pretoria. And apart from purportedly being the seat of government and hosting the whole Oscar Pistorius drama, there does not appear to be much else to speak about except the latest rumblings from the air force bases in the city.

To the unsuspecting eyes of Jo’burgers, there certainly are soldiers aplenty in the capital city. Riding bicycles through midday traffic, or hands outstretched on the side of a forlorn road pleading for a lift - they are as much a part of Pretoria as the Union Buildings, the jacaranda trees and Oscar Pistorius’ arsenal. So while Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, has warned that speculation about the whereabouts of deployed troops are “treasonous”, Pretoria has not taken heed.

Last week, a rumour emerged among some citizens of the capital with close links to the SANDF (so not just a dedicated fan base), that claimed South Africa had sent a “special task team” to Bangui to negotiate with the rebel leadership for the release of SANDF assets. Earlier, Mapisa-Nqakula told Parliament’s joint standing committee on defence the training team in Bangui was supplemented with 200 troops to protect SANDF military assets.

“The extra troops were sent as a protection force, I repeat protection force, for the 26 South African soldiers who were engaged in training exercises,” she said.

During the same briefing, she acknowledged the difficulties of transporting those assets – which included military vehicles. “The movement of those assets from CAR to South Africa cannot take a few days,” she said.

The rumour, then, of a move by South Africa to retrieve those assets from Bangui is significant, not least because it may suggest a reversal on government’s stated refusal to negotiate with rebel leaders. The SANDF itself has strongly refuted the rumour of the asset-retrieval task team.

Spokesperson for the SANDF, Brigadier General Xolani Mabanga, told us the idea that South Africa had initiated attempts to retrieve its assets from Bangui suggested that the SANDF had fled Bangui in a hurry.

“When we were attacked, we fought back,” he said. “There was no point that we ran away.”

“We never left behind anything,” he insisted, adding that South Africa withdrew days after the capital fell to rebels, giving the SANDF ample time to gather its equipment for the trip home.

Military analyst Helmoed Heitman, who recently published The Battle In Bangui with Mampoer, says that while the equipment of the protection team – the 200- strong team that had been deployed to protect the military trainers and assets – had been successfully brought home, some of the assets belonging to the original training mission had not been retrieved.

Heitman tells a fascinating story of a female member of the training mission who risked her own life to retrieve cash from the trainers’ base while the capital fell to rebels. “She should be standing in line for a medal,” he said.

He was, however, less complimentary about the commander of the training mission, who he said absented himself when South African troops came under attack.

“He should be court marshalled,” he said.

In the eventual withdrawal, Heitman says vehicles belonging to the training mission were left behind. So, too, were personal effects of those in the training mission and a satellite communication system worth several hundred thousand rands.

He believes that if anything of those items is worth salvaging, it is the satellite communication system.

Heitman has heard nothing of a special task team deployed to CAR to attempt to retrieve South African-owned equipment. He has, however, heard of a South African minister who travelled to Bangui for a chat with the country’s rebel leadership.

“The Minister of State Security Siyabonga Cwele met with Seleka leaders,” he said.

Up until last month, few among South Africa’s chattering classes would have cared about what exactly the army was up to, so long as funds meant for the military were not being diverted to the construction of another home for its current Commander-in-Chief. The death of South African troops in CAR nonetheless has forced scrutiny on the decisions that govern the movement of South African troops in and out of the country.

All this comes amid reports that government is considering a fresh deployment of South African troops to the embattled CAR.

The Sunday Times reported that if troops were sent, they would be heading to the troubled country as peacekeepers this time, contributing to a 2,000-strong Central Africa Multinational Force. This force would support the transitional CAR government.

President Jacob Zuma told reporters at a summit in Chad on Thursday that he had received a "passionate plea" from the leaders of the Economic Community of Central African States (Eccas).

Department of International Relations spokesman Clayson Monyela told the Sunday Times that government was still considering the request. The SANDF’s Mabanga, however, said the military was, to his knowledge, unaware of any preparations for a fresh deployment to the CAR.

“We only read about it in the media,” he said. DM

Read more:

• CAR debacle: DA gunning for Zuma in Daily Maverick

Photo: Pretoria (Reuters)

DAILY MAVERICK

Khadija Patel

COMMENTS BY SONNY

If I was a visionary I'd say Zuma was acting like an agent of Russia and China.

It's a question of make or break for him!

WHERE WILL ALL THIS CARNAGE END?          

                        

Zumocracy: An addiction to controversy

No Fear No Favour No Dictators allowed here........


RANJENI MUNUSAMY         SOUTH AFRICA     22 APRIL 2013 01:49

President Jacob Zuma can really be his own worst enemy. It is as if he goes out of his way to open himself to controversy, particularly when it comes to vital appointments in his government. Riah Phiyega, Menzi Simelane, Lulu Xingwana, Dina Pule, Bheki Cele, Richard Mdluli and Willem Heath are some of the names that will go down as his high-profile appointments that bombed spectacularly. He is now on the brink of filling two long-standing vacancies in crucial positions in the state, and there is already controversy over one of them. By RANJENI MUNUSAMY.

Let us recall what exactly the Constitutional Court said about the ill-fated appointment of former National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) Menzi Simelane. The matter went to the Constitutional Court as Justice Minister Jeff Radebe and Simelane appealed an earlier judgment by the Supreme Court of Appeal that found President Jacob Zuma's decision to appoint Simelane to be “irrational” and “unconstitutional”.

In a unanimous judgment, the Constitutional Court said in October 2012:

“The president relied on Mr Simelane’s curriculum vitae, which indicated broadly that he had been the Competition Commissioner for a period of a little more than five years and that he had been Director-General for a period of a little more than four years. He also relied on his personal knowledge of Mr Simelane’s personal and professional qualities, though we do not have much detail about the precise contours of this knowledge.

“The president also relied on the advice of the Minister (Radebe) to the effect that from the Minister’s personal knowledge of Mr Simelane, he was a fit and proper person to be appointed National Director. The Minister, who was familiar with both the Ginwala Commission and the Public Service Commission recommendations, advised the president, in effect, that there was no need for him to interrogate these documents and that he would advise that Mr Simelane be appointed, despite the recommendations made by the Ginwala Commission and the Public Service Commission. The basis on which the advice was given will be evaluated later in this judgment.”

The judgment went on to read: “The absence of a rational relationship between means and ends in this case is a significant factor precisely because ignoring prima facie indications of dishonesty is wholly inconsistent with the end sought to be achieved, namely the appointment of a National Director who is sufficiently conscientious and has enough credibility to do this important job effectively.

“The minister’s advice to the president to ignore these matters and to appoint Mr Simelane without more was unfortunate. The material was relevant. The president’s decision to ignore it was of a kind that coloured the rationality of the entire process, and thus rendered the ultimate decision irrational.”

In light of such a biting assessment of the president’s judgement and decision-making ability, it would stand to reason that when a new NDPP is finally appointed, extra care would be taken to ensure that the process is above board. And yet it now appears that Zuma has not learnt from his previous mistakes when it comes to crucial appointments in his administration.

City Press reported on Sunday that Zuma is set to appoint Pinetown Magistrate Stanley Gumede as head of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and Advocate Guido Penzhorn as the new Special Investigating Unit (SIU) boss. Gumede is currently facing various complaints against him that are being probed by the Magistrate’s Commission, the paper said.

Gumede confirmed that he was aware of the complaints but said he did not know what they were about. He also told City Press that he was approached by Zuma’s legal adviser and personal lawyer, Michael Hulley, to lead the NPA. On cue, the Democratic Alliance’s spokeswoman on justice, Dene Smuts, issued a statement questioning the planned appointment of Gumede.

“When the President appointed Advocate Menzi Simelane as NDPP, we said the choice induced a sense of shock in view of his role at the Ginwala Enquiry into Advocate Vusi Pikoli, and questioned how he could be fit and proper when measured against the NPA Act’s requirements of conscientiousness and integrity.

“We took legal action on those exact grounds, which were upheld first by the Supreme Court of Appeal and finally by the Constitutional Court. Both courts confirmed that the fitness and propriety of a NDPP is not a matter for the subjective judgment of the sitting president, as President Zuma in essence asserted. Rather, it must rest on objectively ascertainable jurisdictional facts supporting the requirements of experience, conscientiousness and integrity,” Smuts said.

She said the fact that Gumede had unresolved complaints pending against him raised questions about his suitability for the highest prosecutorial post in the country. “The president’s views on suitability seem once again to be unacceptably subjective,” Smuts said.

Gumede’s credentials may or may not be appropriate for the position of NDPP, but if he is appointed while under investigation by the Magistrate’s Commission, he will be steeped in controversy and unnecessarily have to defend his suitability for the job. And the last thing the beleaguered NPA needs is further controversy to haunt it.

If it is true that Gumede was approached by Hulley, it raises even more questions about the integrity of the process. Apart from being the legal advisor in the presidency, Hulley is also Zuma’s personal attorney. With the spy tapes case still pending, it means that Zuma’s corruption case is still alive. If by some chance the case has to be revisited, the NPA would have to pursue it. Gumede, if appointed, will be in the untenable position of being on opposite ends of the courtroom with the man who offered him his job.

If Zuma does want Gumede for the job, it beggars belief why he does not just follow due process to ensure that he gets it without causing another high-ranking official in his government to be besieged by controversy. Such appointments should ordinarily be processed by the Minister of Justice, but it is clear that Radebe is out of the loop himself.

Following Zuma’s State of the Nation Address, when he promised that all vacant posts “at the upper echelons of the criminal justice system” would be filled, Radebe told a media briefing that the NPA and SIU heads would be appointed by the end of February. Again at the beginning of March, Radebe told the parliamentary portfolio committee on justice that the appointments were “imminent”. No explanation has since been given as to why there has been a delay. It is also inexplicable why Hulley and not Radebe was the one approaching Gumede to offer him the NPA job.

The only possible reason why this would be is that Gumede, if appointed, would be beholden directly to Zuma for his job, instead of following the normal route of accountability. This is neither a desirable nor appropriate situation, and as was evident in the fiasco involving the former Crime Intelligence head Richard Mdluli, who allegedly had a direct line to the president, the potential for abuse and wrongdoing is unlimited.

Zuma already has a trail of bad appointments haunting his presidency – from two dreadful police chiefs, Bheki Cele and now Riah Phiyega, to disgraceful Cabinet ministers like Dina Pule and Lulu Xingwana, who for some inexplicable reason he has not fired. This adds to the string of embarrassments over Simelane, Mdluli and Willem Heath, who resigned as head of the SIU after 17 days in the job. The Department of State Security is still without three directors-general for well over a year after the former intelligence heads resigned.

It would seem that the only criteria for appointment to the security cluster is fierce loyalty to Zuma, and Zuma alone, and making sure his political power is protected. The interests of the state are incidental, and this is why it is so difficult to find credible and skilled candidates to fill all the vacant positions. With so many crucial positions, particularly in the security cluster, vacant, the state is vulnerable, in a holding pattern and functioning far from its optimum.

With Zuma now four years in office as state president, he seems not to have mastered the ability to make crucial appointments appropriately and retain skill in his government. Controversy continues to beset his presidency even in instances where it is wholly unnecessary and avoidable.

But while this might be an undesirable situation for the state, it has not interfered with Zuma’s power and political muscle. Zuma remains politically invincible in the ANC, as he proved at the Manguang conference in December, even with the trail of controversy behind him. In the state, nobody has the ability to challenge or question his authority, so whatever storms have beset his administration have blown over without causing him much unease.

The Zuma state might be the most troubled in post-democracy South Africa, but the president is coasting unhindered towards another term. Controversy, it would seem, is not an impediment to Zuma, but an inevitability. DM

DAILY MAVERICK

COMMENTS BY SONNY

Zuma is out of control.

He really thinks he is above the SA CONSTITUTION in his endeavour to destroy South 

Africa and all its people.

He is becoming a clone copy of Robert Mugabe.

Dingaan had the same attitude before his demise some time ago.

WHERE WILL ALL THIS CARNAGE END.

HAS HE FORGOTTEN THE SITUATION IN OUR COUNTRY?

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In Pretoria: chasing army reports, rumours and a rumpus on CAR

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South African troops may be redeployed to CAR

No Fear No Favours No Suicide Missions to CAR........




Sapa | 21 April, 2013 09:12

A decision on whether South African soldiers would be redeployed to the Central African Republic would be made later this week..

A decision on whether South African soldiers would be redeployed to the Central African Republic would be made later this week, according to a newspaper report.

The Sunday Times reported that if troops were sent, they would be heading to the troubled country as peace-keepers this time, contributing to a 2 000-strong Central Africa Multinational Force.

The force would support the transitional CAR government.

President Jacob Zuma told reporters at a summit in Chad on Thursday that he had received a "passionate plea" from the leaders of the Economic Community of Central African States (Eccas).

International Relations spokesman Clayson Monyela told the newspaper that government was considering the request.

Opposition party leaders called on parliament to scrutinise the decision closely.

The Democratic Alliance's David Maynier told the paper Zuma had misled parliament about reasons for the first deployment of SA troops to CAR, the paper reported.

Cope leader Mosiuoa Lekota said the move would be "unwise".

"To support peace doesn't mean you have to take weapons and go into another country," Lekota was quoted as saying.

In parliament earlier this week, Zuma said he would be extending the deployment of more than 2 000 troops to Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo by another year the paper reported.

Times Live

The Zimbabwe election fiasco: Phantom South African loans and no date in sight

SIMON ALLISON                                                     19 APR 2013 02:46 (SOUTH AFRICA)

Luckily for cash-strapped Zimbabwe, South Africa rescued the upcoming elections with a big loan that didn’t appear to have any strings attached. Except South Africa knew nothing about this rescue, and Zimbabwe’s elections are looking as far away as ever. By SIMON ALLISON.

Zimbabwe’s got a bit of a problem. It’s meant to be having elections this year (well it was meant to have elections last year, but they got delayed). This should, in theory, be a positive step for a country still reeling from the chaos precipitated by the last election. It should be the culmination of the long and often torturous political process which has gone a long way towards stabilising the country and improving its economy, as well as forcing the country’s two major parties to share power (some of it, anyway).
A referendum on a new constitution, held in March, was successful. The voting was largely peaceful, and the new constitution was overwhelmingly approved – even though it is a deeply flawed document. The constitution was the last hurdle that needed to be overcome before elections could be planned.
And elections are being planned. President Robert Mugabe has said the big day will be on 29 June, and – power-sharing or no power-sharing – he still tends to get what he wants.
So what’s the problem?
Money, of course. Zimbabwe hasn’t got any, and the little it could spare went towards conducting the referendum. “We essentially, for lack of a better word, raped the economy for the referendum,” said finance minister Tendai Biti, according to Zimbabwe’s NewsDay.
Elections are expensive – especially if you want them to be free and fair (or at least appear to be free and fair). There’s lots of equipment that must be bought, lots of staff recruited, lots of organising needed. Biti says that Zimbabwe needs $132 million (R1.2 billion) to pull it off properly, but just doesn’t have it.
This is not an unreasonably high figure. Britain’s elections in 2005 cost $122 million, and its 2011 referendum on voting systems was roughly the same. But even austerity budget-Britain has this in reserve, unlike Zimbabwe. So where is the money going to come from?
The obvious candidate is the United Nations, which has rarely been shy of funding democratic processes. Only one problem here: the UN wants to make sure those processes really are democratic. “It was clear that the [UN] team wanted a broader mandate... They kept talking about the security sector and media reforms, all sorts of euphemisms... and that we reject,” said justice minister Patrick Chinamasa this week, implying that the UN was attempting to “manipulate, infiltrate and interfere with” Zimbabwe’s internal processes. This ruled out the United Nations option.
Fortunately, a more amenable donor was found in South Africa – or was it? Earlier this week, Biti told journalists that South African had agreed to stump up $100 million (around R900 million) as a loan towards Zimbabwe’s election. This was the first time, however, the South African public had heard about it – and the South African government didn’t know anything about it either.
Lindiwe Zulu, international relations advisor to President Jacob Zuma and leader of South Africa’s mediation efforts in Zimbabwe, told the Daily Maverick that although there is an existing agreement for South Africa to lend Zimbabwe that amount of money, it is most certainly not for the purpose of holding elections. According to Zulu, this line of credit was agreed by Cabinet in 2009, and officials from both countries’ treasuries are still sitting down to figure out the modalities of the loan. She said that if Zimbabwe wanted help funding its elections, it would have to ask. “We have no such request on the table,” she said.
Which is perhaps fortunate, because civil society has been near universal in warning strongly against making any loans without exacting conditions being attached to them. “South Africa should not lend any money to a government that is largely run by a cabal of crooks,” said Good Governance Africa (GGA) in a statement in response to Daily Maverick questions. The Johannesburg-based research institution sent a team to Zimbabwe to monitor the referendum. “The chances for Zimbabwe of conducting free and fair elections with this money are very slim. It has not harnessed its security forces which continue to harass civic groups. Zanu-PF continues to dominate the electoral commission, making it impossible for it to hold free and fair elections.”
So where does this leave Zimbabwe? In trouble, with Zanu-PF officials already backtracking from the proposed June date, saying that September or October is looking more likely. But, if Zimbabwe is really intent on conducting an election free from international conditions around reform and fairness then there is a solution closer to home.
“Zimbabwe does have alternative sources for funding these elections,” said Good Governance Africa. “It continues to stifle growth and investment in its economy through its indigenisation programme. It also has considerable revenues from its eastern diamond fields, which are run by Zanu-PF, and do not reach state coffers.”
So, Zimbabwe, if you want elections, you might have to ask your politicians to dig into their own suspiciously deep pockets. This, however, seems unlikely to produce free and fair elections – which are looking as unlikely as ever before. DM
Read more:

• SA loan to Zim torches storm on NewsDay
• Being upfront about Zimbabwe loan will avert public anger onBusiness Day

Photo: Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe (R) and Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai address a media conference at State House in the capital Harare January 17, 2013. REUTERS/Philimon Bulawayo

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CAR debacle: DA gunning for Zuma

DAILY MAVERICK

COMMENTS BY SONNY

Are we dealing with King Farouk here?

We have had one "e-SUICIDE MISSION" - can we afford another?

Zuma and his family should possibly emigrate to the CAR.

Then they will all be close to their own "INVESTMENTS!"

LET SANITY AGAIN PREVAIL IN SOUTH AFRICA.

WHO IS SUPPLYING ZUMA WITH ALL THE CASH - OR IS IT BLOOD DIAMONDS?