Thursday, December 27, 2012

South Africa's Jacob Zuma: Pet dogs are part of 'white culture'



South Africa's Jacob Zuma: Pet dogs are part of 'white culture'

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Jacob Zuma
South African President Jacob Zuma celebrates on Dec. 18 after he was reelected for a second term by the African National Congress. (EPA / December 27, 2012)

JOHANNESBURG--South Africa's often controversial president, Jacob Zuma, emboldened after being strongly voted in for a second term as president this month, told black South Africans they should never try to behave like whites.


Buying a pet dog is part of "white culture," said Zuma, a staunch traditionalist, wading into South Africa's often tense debate on race in his first speech after being reelected by the African National Congress. So are taking dogs for walks and spending money on veterinarians when the animals are sick, he said Wednesday in a speech in Impendle, in KwaZulu-Natal, according to a report in the Star newspaper.

Zuma accused some people of caring more for their dogs than people and said they lacked humanity.
The South African president's remarks were controversial because the ANC policy is supposed to support a nonracial, nonsexist democracy.

He warned young blacks not to try to emulate whites, telling them they would lose the respect of fellow black South Africans.
He said young black women who straightened their hair were also trying to be like whites. Hair straightening is common in South Africa, and many other parts of the continent, and most South African supermarkets sell many varieties of hair relaxers designed to straighten hair.

“Even if you apply any kind of lotion and straighten your hair you will never be white,” Zuma said in the speech, which ignited a storm in the media and on Twitter.

He said the African way was to concentrate on family and not pets. When there were marital problems, couples should turn to their families and not to religious leaders, he said.

One South African newspaper, the Mail and Guardian, ran a column under the headline, "Zuma goes barking mad."

Some black South Africans, including a trade union council boss and Zuma critic, Zwelinzima Vavi, reacted by posting photographs of themselves with their dogs, or tweeted how much they loved their canine best friends.

Some posted photographs of President Barack Obama with his dog.

Award-winning South African novelist, poet and playwright Zakes Mda posted an old photograph on Twitter of revered former president Nelson Mandela grinning happily as a Rhodesian Ridgeback dog jumped on him, saying that according to Zuma, Mandela was "un-African."

"There are many different ways of being African. Of being black even. Those who love animals are not less African/black than those who don't," Mda said in another tweet. "Africanness is diverse and varied. It cannot be universalized from one perspective of a tribal man from one small corner of Africa."

It's not the first time Zuma has made controversial comments. In August he said in a TV interview that it was important women get married and have children, to give them "training."

“I wouldn’t want to stay with daughters who are not getting married. You’ve got to have kids. Kids are important to a woman because they actually give an extra training to a woman, to be a mother,” he said at the time, referring to his daughter's marriage.

In 2006, when he went on trial for allegedly raping a family friend, he said he could tell she wanted sex because she was wearing a short skirt. He was acquitted, but was criticized for having unprotected sex with an HIV-positive person.

Presidential spokesman Mac Maharaj released a statement Wednesday saying Zuma's speech was a message to black people to uphold and promote their own culture.

"The essential message from the president was the need to decolonize the African mind post-liberation to enable the previously oppressed African majority to appreciate and love who they are and uphold their own culture.
They should not feel pressured to be assimilated into the minority cultures," Maharaj said.
A small opposition party, the Christian Democratic party, issued a statement warning Zuma's second term would be "even more sectarian and divisive" than his first, the South African Press Assn. reported.
 "This playing up of one culture against another, describing them, not as different, but rather that one has superior moral values to the other, is totally unacceptable and counterproductive," said party leader Theunis Botha.
But Zuma also had some supporters. Young Communist League spokesman Khaya Xaba said in a tweet that a "rich man's dog gets more in the way of vaccination, medicine and medical care than do the workers upon whom the rich man's wealth is built."


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Zuma comments cause canine chaos

2012-12-27 22:23
Johannesburg - It was a dog-eat-dog world on Twitter on Thursday as people argued over President Jacob Zuma's comments that caring for a pet dog was part of "white" culture.

While a flurry of users seemed indignant that Zuma didn't name Jock of the Bushveld his favourite four-legged South African or ask Lassie to come home, many others agreed with the president's sentiments.

One user, YanelaJ, said Zuma's comments were accurate: "How many blacks vs whites do u c walking/running dogs..don't count domestic worker?"

Young Communist League spokesperson Khaya Xaba tweeted that a "rich man's dog gets more in the way of vaccination, medicine and medical care than do the workers upon whom the rich man's wealth is built".

The Star reported on Thursday that Zuma, in a speech given at Impendle in KwaZulu-Natal, had said that spending money to buy a dog and taking it to the vet and for walks, belonged to "white" culture.

Zwelinzima Vavi tweets

He was also reported to have said that those who loved dogs more than people had "a lack of humanity".

The presidency later sent out a statement in which it explained that Zuma was only trying to "decolonise the African mind" with his statements.

Presidential spokesperson Mac Maharaj said that Zuma wanted "to enable the previously oppressed African majority to appreciate and love who they are".

Meanwhile on Twitter, Cosatu general secretary Zwelinzima Vavi tweeted a picture of himself with his Boerboel "Superhero" and his Jack Russell "Maradona".

Some tweeters gently suggested that "Superhero" was a bit on the chubby side, but Vavi reassured his followers that he has managed to get the Boerboel's weight down since the photograph was taken.

Vavi also mentioned that he had given ANC secretary general Gwede Mantashe a puppy years ago. "He keeps dogs too," tweeted Vavi.

Nevertheless, Vavi said that he was not offended by Zuma's comments. "As an animal lover & proudly black I don't feel insulted by that comment - I do have compassion for humans too!!" However, internationally renowned author Zakes Mda refuted the essentialism behind Zuma's statement.

Culture

"There are many ways of being African. Of being black even. Those who love animals are not less African than those who don't."

Journalist Reuben Goldberg suggested that South Africans buy Zuma a dog "and name it #Nkandla".

Even "Bazil the Bulldog" gave his opinion into the matter, tweeting: "Zuma needs a history check, as the Africanis breed of dogs have been the companions of Southern Africa's San Bushmen since 800 AD..."

Ayanda Mlotshwa questioned Zuma's linking of race and dog ownership, stating: "I'm black & I love my dog. He's part of my family. We've always had dogs in my family. Can't imagine life without them."

A number of people also tweeted an old photograph of former president Nelson Mandela beaming alongside a jubilant canine companion.

The Christian Democratic party sent out a statement in which they said it appeared from his remarks that Zuma's second term would be "even more sectarian and divisive" than his first.

"This playing up of one culture against another, describing them, not as different, but rather that one has superior moral values to the other, is totally unacceptable and counterproductive," said party leader Theunis Botha.
- SAPA
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25 Heroic Dogs and How They Saved People

People have always seemed to have a soft spot for heroic dogs. Whether it's TV classics like Lassie or heart-warming family films like Homeward Bound, the idea of dogs rescuing their human masters (or even complete strangers) captures our love and affection as few other things do. So it's only natural to love hearing about dogs who save people in real life! Here are 25 true accounts of dogs who saved people from perilous circumstances.

1) Brutis

Brutis was a 7 year old golden retriever when he became a hero in 2004. That's when the loveable pooch snatched up a coral snake as it was slithering dangerously close to a young child, suffering a near-deadly bite from the snake in the process. His heroics did not go unnoticed however, as Brutis was promptly flown to Los Angeles to recieve the National Hero Dog award.
Said the committee who awarded the medal, "when we give an award like this, we're looking for something extra, something that would make people wonder why a dog would do what he did."

2) Zoey

Everyone knows that smaller dogs have to display in attitude what they lack in size, and Zoey is living proof. A five pound chihuahua from Colorado, Zoey made headlines in 2007 for rescuing a one year old child from an approaching three foot rattlesnake when the snake got too close for comfort. While Zoey sustained a small wound from a snakebite above her eye, she eventually recovered and the snake was killed by the dog's owner.

3) Katrina

Hurricane Katrina was a miserable occurance for everyone down south, but inspiring stories of heroism have helped give victims something to smile about. That's certainly the case with Katrina, the ironically named black labrador who saved a drowning man before rising flood waters claimed his life. The dog, who was later rescued herself by rescue teams, was honored at that year's Genesis Awards with a standing ovation.

4) Shana

In a Fox News story titled "Half-Breed Wolf Dog Hero Rescues Elderly Owners From Snowstorm", readers learn the heroic tale of Shana, a half wolf dog/half German shepard who saved an elderly couple from a treacherous snow storm. When Shana found Norman and Eve trapped by snow, she went to work, diligently digging out a tunnel through which she would pull the couple back to the safety of their home.

5) Maya

You don't get to be the 2008 Dog of the Year for nothing, and this pooch is no exception. Maya took home this year's honors for courageously saving Angela Marcelino, her owner, from a vicious male attacker. The pitbull's act of bravery earned some high praise from the Animal Miracle foundation, who was happy to report that "the pitbull breed can be hero dogs just like any other breed."

6) Moti

2007's Dog of the Year winner was Moti, the five year old German Shepherd who literally took a bullet for his human family. When a masked intruder made his way into the Patel household, Moti wasted little time, leaping to his feet and barking to draw the gunman's attention. Faced with the angry pooch, the gunman shot him and ran off without harming any of the Patels. Luckily, this furry hero is making a full recovery!

7) Honey

Honey was the 2006 Dog of the Year, an award she earned by saving her owner from a violent car accident. When she and Michael Bosch found their SUV rolled over and stuck upside down in a deep ravine, Bosch was trapped and knew that Honey was his only hope. With all his strength,  he managed to release the dog and hope that she would somehow find help. Sure enough, the then 5 month old English Cocker Spaniel got the attention of a man about a half-mile away and brought him to the scene of the accident. Rescuers concluded that had it not been for this, Bosch would have died.

8) Napoleon

Cats and dogs are always made out to be enemies, but this not always so! Enter Napoleon, the English Bulldog who defied the poor swimming skills of his breed to swim deep out into a lake and rescue a burlap sack containing 6 abandoned kittens! While two of the kittens didn't make it, the other four were nursed back to health, leading to a hero's welcome for Napoleon back at the local adoption center.

9) Hero

In a truly heartwarming story, a four year old Golden Retriever was credited with saving a paralyzed man who got his wheelchair stuck in the middle of a muddy field. When Gareth Jones found himself unable to move, the former soldier's service dog was ready to answer the call, dutifully pulling the rope Jones threw to him until the wheelchair was pulled free.
Said Jones, "He didn't let go until I was clear. He knew exactly what he was doing."

10) Eve

Everyone loves those heart-pounding movie scenes where the hero escapes a burning pit seconds before it explodes, but it's not so fun in real life. That's what Kathie, a paralyzed parapalegic, learned when her Rotweiller (Eve) pulled her by the ankles from her burning, smoldering truck. Upon pulling Kathie out, Eve proceeded to drag her to a nearby ditch, just far enough away to avoid the explosion of her vehicle.
After firemen cleared the scene, Eve was awarded the Stillman Award for her bravery.

11) Ginny

Is Ginny a traitor to canine's everywhere, or an undisputed hero? The 300 cats who attended her memorial service would probably say the latter, paying homage to a dog who endangered herself on multiple occasions to save dying or stranded cats from peril. On one particularly remarkable occasion, Ginny threw herself against a vertical pipe at a construction site so that it would topple and the stranded cats inside could escape. Another time, Ginny suffered severe cuts on her paws to find an injured cat inside a box of broken glass.

12) Trakr

Trakr owns arguably the most prestigious rescue on our list. Together with police officer James Symington, Trakr helped dig through some 30 feet of unstable debris at the World Trade Center "ground zero" site and locate the last human survivor of the attack. The dog's bravery was so celebrated that he is going to be cloned for use in other police rescue forces!

13) Shelby

Shelby became the 45th Skippy Dog Hero of the Year for saving two adults and two children from carbon monoxide poisoning. The dog (with her keen sense of smell) was the first to detect the rising C0 levels while the rest of the family was asleep, nudging each of them out of their sleep and refused to stop barking, scratching, and whining until the family was safely outside. Luckily, each family member was treated at a nearby hospital and made a full recovery.
"In my eyes, and in the eyes of my family, Shelby is more than a hero; she is a lifesaver, a guardian angel," said Joleen Walderbach.

14) Rocky

A Lakewood, Colorado police dog, Rocky made headlines in 2002 for chasing down a burglar, taking a bullet in the process and ultimately helping to capture the 20 year old thug. According to Darren Mauer, the dog's officer/partner, the bullet to Rocky's paw never slowed him down. "He was the same dog after as he was before."

15) Blue

Most people wouldn't dare to go one-on-one with an alligator, but that's exactly that Blue did to take home 2001 "Dog Hero of the Year" honors. The Australian Blue Heeler saved Ruth Gay, his 85 year old owner, from an alligator attack behind her home. Reportedly, Ms. Gay had fallen while walking Blue. When a nearby gator lumbered over, threatening to attack, Blue charged into action and sparred with the gator long enough to scare it away. Both Gay and Blue made full recoveries, and blue was awarded with doggie treats, cash, and a specially engraved Dog Hero food bowl.

16) Patty

Blue's runner up to the 2001 award was Patty, a yellow lab retreiver who saved her owner from drowning while on a winter duck hunting excursion. After Ray Fogg's boat capsized and dumped the two into frigid North Atlantic waters, Patty allowed him to grab hold of her tail while she vigorously doggy-paddled against the powerful current. They made it all the way to the nearest land, where they were rescued by game wardens later on that evening.

17) Neo

This 11 month old Siberian husky earned his hero stripes by getting human help for his imperiled owner, Marci Snead. When Snead (a diabetic with fibromyalsia and rheumatoid arthritis) went into hypoglycemic shock, Neo ran to the nearest building. There, he grabbed the attention of several people who followed Neo back to where Snead had fallen. Within moments, an ambulance was called and the women carted off to a nearby hospital, where she recovered completely.

18) Kankuntu

It's not every day that a dog saves its family from armed pirates at sea, but amazingly, that's exactly what Kankuntu did. When Peter Lee found himself about to be hijacked on his 41 foot yacht by armed pursuers, the dog (who "thinks he's a lion") leapt right into action, furiously attacking the gunmen until one of them shot and stabbed the pooch between his shoulder blades. Amazingly, the dog was nursed back to the health and the family continued with their voyage.

19) Junior

Don't let the name fool you; there was nothing "junior" or small about this dog's effort. As fire tore through the Davilmar household in the middle of the night, the 14 month old shihtzu mix started barking and did not relent until everyone (including the family's half-dozen visiting relatives) was awake and out of the house.

20) Belle

In a nearly unbelievably story titled "Dog Makes Cell Phone Call to Save Owner's Life", readers learn about Belle, a beagle who literally bit "911" into Kevin Weaver's cell phone after the diabetic man collapsed from a seizure. Said Weaver, "there's no doubt in my mind that I'd be dead if I didn't have Belle", who became the first canine to win VITA's Wireless Samaritan Award. Evidently, the pooch had been trained to bite down on the phone's keypad in the event of an emergency!

21) Toby

MSNBC tells the story of Toby, a golden retriever who heroically saved owner Debbie Parkhurst from choking to death on an apple in her Maryland home. When it became apparent that she was choking, the dog leapt hard onto her chest and forced the lodged morsel to come loose from her throat. For his efforts, Toby took home a share of the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals' "Dog of the Year" award in 2007.

22) Nyla

Nyla is another dog that risked her own life to save her human owner from the threat of fire. When Sheila found herself surrounded by smoke and flames, unable to see in front of her, Nyla courageously buided her toward a nearby door, barking whenever Sheila lost track of her. While her home and belongings were destroyed, Sheila was guided to safety, noting that "Nyla could have left anytime. Instead, she chose to stay and risk her own life and face death to save me."

23) Roselle

When Michael Hingson found himself on the 78th floor of the World Trade Center on September 11, it took some unexpected heroics from his yellow labrador to save his life. When the building started to sway and the air filled with choking smoke, Roselle lead Michael to safety, guiding him through the crumbling office toward a stairwell. It wasn't easy for Michael or Roselle, who was panting and extremely thirsty, but the two managed to reach safety just moments before Tower 1 collapsed.


24) Nellie

All dogs are known for their super-sharp hearing, but most of them don't win awards for it. But when Nellie, a 4 year old black lab, used her high powered ears to detect an intruder in time to save her severely deaf owner, it would've been a crime to give the Heroic Hearing Dog of the Year award to anyone else! The charity that trained Nellie couldn't have been more proud.

25) Kaze

Kaze earned top honors from the Contra Costa Sheriff's Department for saving the life of a woman in her late 20's, reported missing a few days earlier. On his first-ever rescue mission, Kaze located the missing woman under a bridge, in a coma that authorities later reported that would have killed her within the hour if she had not been found. Luckily, the woman was rushed to a hospital, where she recovered after a week's time.
Breeds: A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z

Wednesday, December 26, 2012

Marikana: Truth, memory and reportage


Panic and confusion: Police officers firing at striking miners outside Lonmin’s Marikana platinum mine left many wounded and dead in their wake. (Reuters) 21 DEC 2012 00:00 - KWANELE SOSIBO Telling the real story behind the shocking killings on the koppie of Lonmin's Marikana mine was never going to be easy, writes Kwanele Sosibo. SPECIAL FOCUS 2012: It's a wrap MORE COVERAGE Marikana: Farlam Inquiry reveals wounded protesters were 'shot again' Claims of intimidation at Marikana commission Marikana families blame deaths on police, Lonmin In the media, it was a time for assumptions. A radio news report on the morning of August 14 said about 500 heavily armed miners, believed to be Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (Amcu) members, were convening close to a mountain and refusing to speak to journalists. At a press conference at Lonmin’s offices later that day, Barnard Mokwena, the company’s vice-president of human capital and external affairs, told journalists that the death toll stood at nine and “someone must account for the nine lives before we talk to them [the strikers] or we’ll be legitimising criminal activity”. Speaking after Lonmin management, National Union of Mine-workers (NUM) general secretary Frans Baleni said Minister of Safety and Security Nathi Mthethwa had reassured him serious steps would be taken. He added that Lonmin had decided to offer a raise of up to R750 a month for different categories of drillers. “These people,” he said, referring to Amcu, “went to mobilise [rock drill operators] and said we’ll get you R12 500.” For the unions, the blame game was in full swing. Amcu held a separate press conference on the East Rand in which they blamed the violence on sinister forces emerging from the NUM’s “reclaim Lonmin” campaign. Leaving Lonmin’s offices for the Nkanini informal settlement, we parked our cars on its southwestern edge and carefully inched towards the koppie. It was just after 1pm and the crowd, readying for an address by its leaders, had swelled to thousands. Palpable trepidation among journalists The violent strike had been going on for five days by the time we arrived on August 14. The body count was climbing. It was not only workers who were falling – two security guards had been set alight on Sunday and two police officers had been killed on Monday. There was palpable trepidation in the eyes of every journalist as we moved closer to the crowd. We got word that we should remove caps and jewellery, switch off our phones and keep our female colleagues away. The reason for this was not openly disclosed, but the empty PVC tubs and a portable bath made it obvious that a ritual of some kind was in progress. We made contact with the seemingly autonomous leadership, who allowed their side of the story to be told, but only through handpicked commentators. The tension and volatility of being surrounded by a sprawling mass of discontent was numbing on one level, but the tinny crackle of voices fed through the loud-hailer that workers used to address each other rendered the atmosphere electric and urgent. Watching how tightly the miners stage-managed what was in effect a press conference was an insightful lesson in how consensus is maintained in strikes. Of the five selected speakers, three isiXhosa-speaking men spoke without interruption. One, who introduced himself as Tholakele Bhele, said: “We are all Lonmin employees. No union is representing us.” When asked how the workers knew that it was the NUM that had shot at them the previous Saturday, Bhele faltered for a second and had to be coached by one of his colleagues. Impromptu press conference A second man, who gave his name as Mandla Thonjeni, told us: “We retaliated, but they drew first blood.” It was a reference to gunfire said to have come from the NUM office on August 11. The last, a Shangaan-speaker, was cut off when he made the mistake of claiming that “rock drill operators” instead of “all mine workers” wanted R12 500. A short, bald-headed man who looked to be in his 20s snatched the loudspeaker from the older man and with that our impromptu press conference was all but over. Looking back, being unable to afford an education for their children was the resonant cry of all we spoke to. But at that moment, blinded by fear for my own safety, all I could see was angry and distrustful faces. At about 2pm that day, as we retreated from the koppie, a 50-strong convoy of armoured and “soft” police vehicles made its way from the joint operations centre near Lonmin’s offices towards Wonderkop. Half the vehicles turned east into the hostel grounds and the other half snaked into the adjacent informal settlement coming out of its western edge, near the koppie where the miners had gathered. It was a grand display of manpower. But later that day the prostrate body of Isaiah Twala, an NUM shop steward, was found near the same koppie; a deep, machete-inflicted wound ran down the side of his face. On Wednesday journalists looked on as NUM president Senzeni Zokwana was booed by workers who would later warmly receive Amcu president Joseph Mathunjwa, electing him as their sole emissary to Lonmin management. Police still had options Thursday, on the day of the massacre, I was not at Marikana, despite the talk of “D-day” and “moving in” from police spokesperson Dennis Adriao. Besides being on deadline, I simply did not believe that a massacre would transpire. Police still had various options, I thought, such as sealing off the empty koppie at night and conducting a raid if they were after weapons. I watched the shootings of the miners unfold on my office television with a sense of bewilderment and embarrassment. I phoned a panicked Xolani Nzuza, the man who had snatched the loudspeaker from his colleague two days earlier. He said he had managed to flee into the informal settlement and change clothes, but said little else coherent in his panicked state. It was the following day at Nkanini when I first began to hear anecdotes of how miners were finished off by police officers on foot and in Nyalas as they fled the main koppie. We published these accounts in an online article the following Monday. On August 22, Lybon Mabasa, president of the Socialist Party of Azania, told the Mail & Guardian that workers pointed out the remnants of a crushed skull to him. Greg Marinovich’s piece, which was published in the Daily Maverick and in the M&G that same week, told the full horror of the executions that took place in the smaller koppies to the west of the miners’ gathering place. His work was the mark of a veteran – a break from the officialdom that swamped the initial narrative. Opportunists seize the moment By that time, Marikana was abuzz with a confluence of agendas. The clergy, Julius Malema and the fractured left – all seeking a reinvigorating cause – descended on the town like famished vultures on to a corpse. The Democratic Socialist Movement, having long held Rustenburg as the “centre of gravity” for a mounting “workers rebellion” (as executive member Mametlwe Sebei told the M&G), co-ordinated an independent joint strike committee that shook the platinum and gold sectors with a series of rolling strikes that refuse to die down completely. At a joint strike co-ordinating committee meeting in Marikana on October 13, the socialist movement revealed that its intention was to organise a Workers and Socialist Party. Having sat in at most of the Marikana commission of inquiry sessions since its start on October 1, I know it has a useful mandate to fulfil, but it is no conduit to grasping the dynamics fully of the platinum belt. In fact, many role players shunned the media because of the commission, making balanced reporting on the strike wave difficult. The didacticism of the left and the defensive propaganda of an NUM caught napping were also of little value. Although still in its early stages, the commission has already helped to clarify the epochal puzzle that is the Lonmin strike. For example, we now know the NUM’s Zokwana was rejected by his own members; according to evidence before the commission, 52% of the workers gathered at the koppie were NUM members and only 35% belonged to Amcu. The rest were not unionised. Miners shot in a state of panic We have also heard there is no evidence of deaths from the NUM office shootings on August 11, although the workers still argue differently. We now know that shooting on August 16 at the main koppie began 30 seconds after the firing of the last tear-gas canister and immediately after a water cannon was sprayed, showing that miners were shot in a state of panic. Even with the police’s dogged determination to conceal the facts, information continues to emerge, sometimes inadvertently, from the police themselves. In footage captured by a helicopter at the time of the massacre, a Colonel Solomon Vermaak can be heard saying: “No need to shoot while they are running unless they are targeting you,” suggesting that police were running amok, contravening standing orders. Although an Al Jazeera news camera captured at least one miner firing at police officers with a pistol, we have since learned that the police planted several weapons on miners as they tampered with the crime scene. And the journalists reliving the massacre on a daily basis? They often hide behind bravado and the pressure of deadlines. If self-medication does not get them first, Marikana will make them better journalists – more caring, more astute and less fearful. Kwanele Sosibo is a staff reporter for the Mail & Guardian Mail & Guardian - - - COMMENTS BY SONNY - - - - Can the ANC ever compare this to Apartheid, Sharpeville, Soweto Riots 1976 or the Bang Bang Club? We don't think so. What is the price of this 'Newly Established ANC Democracy? Only Zuma will know the answer! The President did not give the order to shoot - He was out of the Country!

Salute...Green Boots.... Koevoet !

Koevoet Story
THE STORY
The Covert War is compelling reading. In 1978 the counter-insurgency war on the Angolan/SWA Namibian border was going badly for the South Africans. Externally the SADF was in control, but internally SWAPO was gaining the upper hand. The SAP Commissioner and SADF Chief met to find a solution. They decided to form a joint 5-Recce Commando/Security Branch organisation on the lines of the Rhodesian Selous Scouts. A highly experienced Security Branch officer, Col ‘Sterk’ [strong] Hans’ Dreyer, was despatched to Owamboland with five police officers. They were tasked under‘Top Secret’ Project Koevoet (crowbar) to find and provide operational intelligence for the Recces. But they needed the Recces to provide captures for interrogation, but they were heavily engaged in operations in Angola. Col Dreyer came to realise that the situation in SWA/Namibia was completely different to the Rhodesian scene. What worked in Rhodesia wouldn’t necessarily work there. So his team reverted to basic police work, building informer networks and so on. A single arrest led to the smashing of SWAPO’s sabotage networks throughout the country. During one investigation three policemen, armed only with pistols, almost blundered into a large PLAN group which would have spelt their certain death. This narrow escape resulted in the recruitment of black special constables into units to protect the investigators. This led to a realisation of the astonishing tracking abilities of the Owambos. While tracking has been a tactic used by the military since time eternal, it had never become a strategy where it was always used — which is what happened with Koevoet. It led to the unit’s major expansion. As with other insurgencies in southern Africa, the Security Forces were faced with a serious landmine threat. This problem for Koevoet was overcome when it was equipped with the remarkable mine-protected Casspirs. Combining their police investigational abilities and skills at getting information, the tracking abilities of their special constables, the landmine protection provided by their Casspirs — with the support of SAAF helicopter gunships — Koevoet emerged as the premier counter-insurgency unit in SWA/Namibia. It cut bloody swathes through PLAN’s internal organisation and tellingly acted in support of the army in southern Angola. In its ten year existence it fought in 1 615 contacts and killed or captured 3 225 PLAN soldiers — the equivalent of almost six battalions of troops. But it paid a high price in blood and lost almost 160 policemen killed in action with another 949 wounded — more grievous casualties than any other South African fighting unit since World War II. After heroically repelling SWAPO’s invasion of Namibia in April 1989 — while fighting under the direct authority of the Secretary-General of the United Nations — the unit was ignominiously disbanded and its black members disgracefully abandoned to take their chances at the unforgiving hands of their former SWAPO foes. While this book is expressly focused on Koevoet, it is also the first full story of the internal border war in Namibia. http://www.galago.co.za/cat1_010_b.htm ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://koevoet.webklik.nl/page/the-story

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Koevoet (pronounced [ˈkuːfut]) (Afrikaans and Dutch for crowbar), also known as Operation K and officially denoted as the South West Africa Police Counter-Insurgency Unit (SWAPOL-COIN), was a paramilitary-trained police counter insurgency unit in South-West Africa during the Namibian Independence War. ("Crowbar" was an allusion to Koevoet's mission of prying insurgents from the local population).




The unit is presently considered one of the most effective fighting forces deployed against communist-backed SWAPO liberation fighters during apartheid, although it remained notorious for committing acts of brutality against civilians.

Contents



1 History

1.1 International Background

1.2 South African Border War

1.3 Formation

2 Structure

3 Training

4 Tactics

5 Disbanding

6 See also

7 Further reading

8 Footnotes

9 References

10 External links



History

International Background

See also: History of Namibia and Decolonization of Africa



At the end of World War I, the former German South-West Africa was granted to South Africa as a mandated territory through the League of Nations. By the 1960s, however, much of Africa was embroiled in a struggle for independence from colonial powers such as Belgium, Great Britain, France, and Portugal. In the southern subcontinent, where many indigenous tribes had been pushed off their lands by settled Europeans, the political situation was particularly explosive. Then governed by its apartheid administration, South Africa watched with concern as low intensity conflicts and guerrilla warfare in neighbouring countries ousted traditional white regimes, often replacing them with Marxist-oriented single party states such as those in Zambia, Angola, and Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia).



Determined to prevent South-West Africa from following this example, South African authorities stepped up their efforts to retain control over their protectorate. When the League of Nations was dissolved with World War II and replaced by the United Nations in 1945, Pretoria refused to recognise the new Trusteeship Council for mandates. Instead, Jan Christiaan Smuts' administration insisted on the right to annexation. In 1950, the UN confirmed that South Africa's legal administration was still in force and that it could not officially compel the latter to open a new trusteeship agreement.Even after the General Assembly officially assumed its powers as successor to the old League and revoked the mandate in 1966, South-West Africa remained a de-facto "fifth province" of its larger neighbour.

South African Border War

Main article: South African Border War



The Namibian Independence War (and its related border conflicts) began when the South West African People's Organisation commenced its armed struggle against what it termed an illegal occupation of South-West Africa. Disappointed that the UN had failed to take decisive executive action to ensure independence, SWAPO, a prominent independentist group, declared from its Tanzania offices that "We have no alternative but to rise in arms and bring about our liberation." This did not come as a surprise to many observers, who pointed out that as early as 1962 the organisation had already announced that violence was necessary as part of an overall strategy seeking change - a decision which allowed authorities to legitimately brand known members as terrorists.



In 26 August, 1966, the first military engagement was fought when armed SWAPO guerrillas clashed with South African security forces in Ovamboland. A month later, a second SWAPO raid was attempted on a major administrative complex in Oshikango.South Africa soon found herself confronted with frequent attacks on tribal figureheads, government installations, and Grootfontein farming regions - the last of these targets in particular caused consternation among white South-West African civilians.



By 1971, the International Court of Justice had ruled South Africa's occupation of South-West Africa to be illegal under international law.At this point, SWAPO was the most effective nationalist group in the territory. It enjoyed thorough support from South-West Africa's largest tribe, the Ovambo, and guerrillas active with its military wing (self-styled the "People's Liberation Army Namibia") were often indistinguishable from the local population.



From the South African perspective, combating PLAN was part of a counter-terrorist initiative against those who were viewed as pawns of international communism. However, the world community increasingly took the opinion that the conflict was a legitimate bid for national liberation; UN officials unilaterally recognised SWAPO as the "sole authentic representative of the Namibian people" and "the future government of Namibia". Atrocities were already being charged by both sides, with Pretoria condemning SWAPO's systematic attacks on basic infrastructure and indiscriminate use of land mines. The latter retaliated in 1973 by drawing attention to the mistreatment of terrorist suspects in military detention.



Fierce fighting eventually drove ten percent of South-West Africa's population into exile; 69,000 citizens crossed the border into Angolan territory, while another 5,000 fled to Zambia. Among these refugees were potential SWAPO recruits who subsequently sought insurgent training in Arab Africa, the Soviet Union, China, or North Korea. By the late 1970s, contacts between SWAPO and the South African Defence Force averaged one per day; over 900 clashes with nationalist guerrillas were reported each year.



Successful anti-colonial wars elsewhere also had a direct impact on events in South-West Africa.
Victorious liberation movements in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Angola offered varying degrees of material support for SWAPO. The new Angolan regime in particular proved an active benefactor, and permitted PLAN to operate from within their national boundaries.
Deadlier escalation followed in 1978 when the SADF began crossing into Angola to strike at SWAPO positions; such actions were justified as necessary to prevent would-be 'freedom fighters' from infiltrating south into Ovamboland. 60,000 South African soldiers were deployed to the operational area,and defence costs spiraled upwards - eventually consuming a solid ten percent of Pretoria's total expenditure. PLAN responded by deploying increasingly sophisticated weaponry, including rockets, mortars, and an anti-aircraft arsenal of Soviet origin.

Formation



In many countries there is a formal separation of duties between civilian law enforcement and the military. The former is generally responsible for domestic issues while the latter is deployed in defence of the nation. At first this philosophy was adopted in South-West Africa. Guerilla operations inside the country were dealt with by the police. Insurgents were seen as common criminals that should be processed by the criminal justice system. However, insurgents used military equipment which normal police officers were not equipped or trained to deal with.



In 1978, Magnus Malan directed the SAP to establish an intelligence gathering paramilitary unit similar to the Selous Scouts.The Selous Scouts was an elite unit that had demonstrated how small units, trained to unusually high levels of expertise, could have an impact disproportionate to their size. Koevoet was founded under the name "Operation K" by Colonel Hans Dreyer, a veteran of the Rhodesian Special Air Service and an avid scholar of counter-insurgency combat. The name "Koevoet" was subsequently popularised by people such as police minister Louis le Grange.



Koevoet was largely based around the Namibia-Angola border and the Caprivi Strip. Most of the recruits were black policemen led by white officers. A few mercenaries and former FNLA/UNITA operatives from Angola were also known to have served in the unit, along with former SWAPO guerillas who were given a chance to serve the South African authorities by joining Koevoet's ranks. Early 1979 saw the first Koevoet operations carried out by ten trained troopers and about sixty local conscripts. These were largely involving surveillance of suspected SWAPO activists, known Communists, and other criminals. By 1980, however, Koevoet had carried out several raids on guerilla camps and engaged in violent firefights with SWAPO fighters. According to the South West African authorities, in that year alone five hundred rebel operatives were killed or arrested by the paramilitary at the cost of only twelve men. By 1984, search and destroy combat operations had taken precedence over intelligence gathering.



A large part of Koevoet's later work included APC patrols into guerilla-held areas. Sometimes mortar attacks were carried out on guerilla camps, followed by armoured assaults. If necessary, a number of the operators would later dismount and pursue the enemy with small arms. Skilled trackers drawn from the local population were also hired to hunt down fugutives sought by the police. Clashes between SWAPO and Koevoet became increasingly costly and fierce; in 1989 official estimates suggested that over three thousand guerilla fighters were being killed or captured each year by the one unit alone. Their use of torture and assassination, however, proved to be their undoing; SWAPO compiled a list of atrocities committed by Koevoet which was promptly released to the international press. Even the South African government finally bowed to pressure and tried several operators for murder. In 1985 heavily armed Koevoet squads indiscriminately opened fire on anti-apartheid protestors in Windhoek.

Structure



Koevoet was a +-1000-man force consisting of about 900 Ovambo and about 300 white officers and SAP non-commissioned officers (NCOs). It was organized into 40 to 50-man platoons equipped largely with mine-resistant armored personnel carriers called Casspirs and Wolf Turbo s for conducting patrols, a Duiker fuel truck and a Blesbok supply vehicle (both variants of a Casspir). They rotated one week in the bush for one week at camp.



There were three Koevoet units based in Kaokaland, Kavango, and Ovambo with each unit over several platoons.



Koevet's internal structure was the brainchild of Hans Dreyer (later a Major-General in the SAP) to develop and exploit counter-insurgency intelligence. The concept was originally modeled on the Portuguese Flechas and Rhodesia's Selous Scouts.



By the mid 1980s, certain estimates put Koevoet's size at over a thousand troops.[citation needed] The organization established its formal headquarters in the present day town of Oshakati, Namibia.

Training



The white officers were either South-West African or South-African police officers and, as often as not, untrained for what were effectively military operations. Accordingly, these officers were usually sent for additional training with South African Special Forces Brigade in bushcraft, tracking and small arms handling and tactics.



The Ovambo and Bushman trackers were rated as Special Constables, who essentially underwent intensive basic infantry training although many were captured and "turned" SWAPO fighters that had already received training of a sort elsewhere.



From a Koevoet operator's perspective, Special Constables were "Counter Insurgency" (COIN) (Afrikaans: Teen Insurgensie (TEIN)), while Koevoet operators were Koevoete (meaning plural of Koevoet) and had higher status than Special Constables.



The trackers of the unit in the early days were local Owambu and not Bushmen as often claimed, but operations were conducted with the bushman and paratrooper "bat" units with success. The Owambu, although accepting the skills of the bushmen, were in close competition and were in actual tracking and not just knowledgeable of the habits of the "tracked" equal.

Tactics



Koevoet operatives learned many of their later tactics during service in the Rhodesian Bush War. A number of the men were originally sent as part of a South African support unit which trained under the BSAP paramilitary. It was because of this past association with the BSAP (Known as the "Black Boots" for their distinctly black footwear) that Koevoet would subsequently be referred to commonly as the "Green Boots". Several members of the former organization were later offered positions in Koevoet following the end of Rhodesia's white minority rule.



Koevoet operations used highly mobile units that tracked groups of SWAPO fighters who were on foot. Their tracks were picked up in various ways, but most often from:[citation needed]



Interrogation of PLAN fighers

Intimidation of local inhabitants

Patrols of areas favoured for crossing by SWAPO fighters

Following up after attacks carried out by SWAPO



Once a suspicious track was found, a vehicle would leap-frog ahead a few kilometres to check for the same tracks, and once found, the other vehicles would race up to join them. Using this technique they could make quickly catch up with the guerillas who were travelling on foot. The technique borrowed strongly from experience gained during the Rhodesian Bush War.



The trackers could provide accurate estimates on the distance to the enemy, the speed at which they were travelling and their states of mind. They were able to do this by "reading" factors such as abandoned equipment, changes from walking to running speed, reduced attempts at anti-tracking or splintering into smaller groups taking different directions ("bomb shelling"). Once the trackers sensed that the SWAPO fighters were close, they would often call in close air support and retreat to the safety of the Casspir armoured personnel carriers to face an enemy typically armed with RPG-7 rocket launchers, rifle grenades, AK-47s, SKS carbines, mines and RPK and PKM machine guns.



Koevoet members were financially rewarded through bounty system, which paid them for kills, prisoners and equipment they captured. This practice allowed many of the members to earn significantly more than their normal salary, and resulted in competition between units. It also resulted in a complaints being raised by the Red Cross about the disproportionately low number of prisoners taken, and accusations of summary executions of prisoners.



Former SADF generals like Constand Viljoen and Jan Geldenhuys were very critical of Koevoet's activities, considering them cruel and crude, and undermining of the army's "hearts and minds" campaign.

Disbanding



SWAPO's accusations that Koevoet had conducted intimidation of voters during registration for the election was taken up by the United Nations. Consequently, in October 1989, Koevoet was disbanded so that SWAPO could not accuse South Africa of influencing the election. Its members were incorporated nationwide into the South West African Police (SWAPOL). A notable percentage of operators were also known to have taken up work with the South-West Africa Territorial Force.



The Koevoet issue was one of the most difficult the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) had to face. Because the unit was formed after the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978 (calling for South Africa's immediate withdrawal from Namibia), it was not mentioned in the eventual settlement proposal or related documents. Once Koevoet's role became clear, the UN Secretary-General took the position that it was a paramilitary unit and, as such, should be disbanded as soon as the settlement proposal took effect. About 2,000 of its members had been absorbed into SWAPOL before the implementation date of April 1, 1989 but they reverted to their former role against the SWAPO insurgents in the "events" of early April 1989. Although ostensibly re-incorporated into SWAPOL in mid-May, the ex-Koevoet personnel continued to operate as a counter-insurgency unit travelling around the north in armoured and heavily armed convoys. In June 1989, the UN Special Representative in Namibia and head of UNTAG, Martti Ahtisaari, told the Administrator-General (South African appointee Louis Pienaar) that this behaviour was inconsistent with the settlement proposal, which required the police to be lightly armed. Some Koevoet operators later maintained that where the SWAPOL-COIN police forces were weakened in order to meet the demand set by the proposal document, SWAPO had not yet relinquished its position and capabilities as an armed insurgent force, thus necessitating their cautious defiance.



The vast majority of the ex-Koevoet personnel were quite unsuited for continued employment in Namibian law enforcement and, if the issue was not dealt with soon, Ahtisaari threatened to dismiss Pienaar.



Ahtisaari's tough stance in respect of these continuing Koevoet operations made him a target of the South African Civil Cooperation Bureau. According to a hearing in September 2000 of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, two CCB operatives (Kobus le Roux and Ferdinand Barnard) were tasked to give the UNTAG leader a "good hiding". To carry out the assault, Barnard had planned to use the grip handle of a metal saw as a knuckleduster. In the event, Ahtisaari did not attend the meeting at the Keetmanshoop Hotel, where Le Roux and Barnard were laying in wait for him, and thus escaped injury.



There ensued a difficult process of negotiation with the South African government which continued for several months. The UN Secretary-General pressed for the removal of all ex-Koevoet elements from SWAPOL, with Ahtisaari bringing to Pienaar's attention many allegations of misconduct by them. UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar visited Namibia in July 1989, following which the UN Security Council demanded that Koevoet formally disarm and the dismantle its command structure. Under such pressure, the South African foreign minister, Pik Botha, announced on September 28, 1989 that some 1,200 ex-Koevoet members of SWAPOL would be demobilized the next day. A further 400 such personnel were demobilized on October 30 - both events were supervised by UNTAG military monitors.

See also



Eugene de Kock, notable former Koevoet operator

Executive Outcomes

Angolan Civil War

South African Border War

32 Battalion



Further reading



Vanneman, Peter (1990). Soviet Strategy in Southern Africa: Gorbachev's Pragmatic Approach. Hoover Press Publications. ISBN 0-8179-8901-3.

Hooper, Jim (1988). Koevoet. Southern Book Publishers. ISBN 1-86812-167-4.

Kamongo, Sisingi; Bezuidenhout, Leon (2011). Shadows in the Sand: A Koevoet Tracker's Story of an Insurgency War. International Pub Marketing. pp. 293. ISBN 0-620-47479-3.

Stiff, P. The Covert War: Koevoet Operations in Namibia 1979-1989, Galago Publishing Pty Ltd, 2000. ISBN 1-919854-03-7

Zhu, Yunxia (1999). "§5: Violence and Intimidation in Namibia". UN Peacekeeping in Action: The Namibian Experience. Nova Publishers. ISBN 1-56072-653-9.



Footnotes



^ Hooper 1988, p. 232.

^ Venter 1994, p. 127-168.

^ Turner 1988.

^ a b c d e f g h Green, Sparks. Namibia: The Nation After Independence. pp. 1-134.

^ a b c d e f g Fryxell, Cole. To Be Born a Nation. pp. 1-200.

^ a b Thomas McGhee, Charles C.; N/A, N/A, eds. (1989). The plot against South Africa (2nd ed.). Pretoria: Varama Publishers. ISBN 0-620-14537-4.

^ "Namibia: Apartheid, resistance and repression (1945-1966)". Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa. August 2009. Retrieved 15 April 2011.

^ Petronella Sibeene (17 April 2009). "Swapo Party Turns 49". New Era.

^ "Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence Of South Africa In Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)". International Court of Justice. 20 April 2012.

^ a b c Forsythe, David. Encyclopedia of Human Rights. pp. 1-21.

^ Bothma, Louis J (2006). Die Buffel Struikel: Die storie van 32 Bataljon en sy mense. LJ Bothma. pp. 383. ISBN 0-620-37296-6.

^ Kamongo, Sisingi (2011). Shadows in the Sand. 30 degrees south. pp. 293. ISBN 0-620-47480-7.

^ http://sadf.sentinelprojects.com/bg2/911text.html

^ O'Brien 2011, p. 104.

^ a b O'Brien 2011, p. 105.

^ Chesterman 2001, p. 27.

^ Lord 2008, p. 252.

^ Lord 2008, p. 247.

^ TRC-Violations.

^ TRC-1998, p. 70.

^ Hamann 2001, p. 65-65.

^ Wren 1989.

^ Howard 2008, p. 76.

^ CCB-2000.

^ UNTAG.



References



"Koevoet Member Confesses to Commission". Cape Town: SAPA. 23 July 1997. Retrieved 19 April 2012.

"Sean Mark Callaghan Application for Amnesty". Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South Africa). 29 Jan 2001. Retrieved 19 Arp 2012.

Turner, John W. (1998). Continent Ablaze. The Insurgency Wars in Africa 1960 to the Present. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball. ISBN 1-85409-128-X.

Chesterman, Simon (2001). Civilians in War. Lynne Rienner Publishers. ISBN 1-55587-965-9.

Venter, Al J (1994). The Chopper Boys. Helicopter Warfare in Africa. Gibraltar: Ashanti. ISBN ISBN 1-85367-177-0.

Wren, Christopher S. (October 1, 1989). "South Africa Disbands Special Police in Namibia". New York Times. Retrieved 2007-10-24.

"Targeted by the Civil Cooperation Bureau". Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South Africa). 28 Sep 2000.

Truth and Reconciliation Commission Human Rights Violations Health Sector Hearings (Truth and Reconciliation Commission June 17, 1997). Text

"Namibia: UNTAG Background". United Nations. 2001-06-07.

Howard, Lise Morjé (Spring 2002). "UN Peace Implementation in Namibia: The Causes of Success". International Peacekeeping 9 (1).

Hooper, Jim (1988). Koevoet!. Southern Book Publishers. ISBN 1-86812-167-4.

Howard, Lise Morjé (2008). UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 052188138.

Lord, Dick (2008). From Fledgling To Eagle: The South African Air Force During the Border War. 30° South Publishers. ISBN 1-920143-30-0.

Truth and Reconcilliation Commission of South Africa] (Report). Volume 2. 1998.

Hamann, Hilton (2001). Days of the Generals. Zebra. ISBN 1-86872-340-2.

O'Brien, Kevin A (2011). The South African Intelligence Services: From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 0-415-43397-5.



External links    ( Wikipedia )

Tuesday, December 25, 2012

Jailed Afghan Drug Lord Was Informer on U.S. Payroll





Jailed Afghan Drug Lord Was Informer on U.S. Payroll



At the height of his power, Mr. Juma Khan was secretly flown to Washington for a series of clandestine meetings with C.I.A. and D.E.A. officials in 2006
By James Risen

WASHINGTON — When Hajji Juma Khan was arrested and transported to New York to face charges under a new American narco-terrorism law in 2008, federal prosecutors described him as perhaps the biggest and most dangerous drug lord in Afghanistan, a shadowy figure who had helped keep the Taliban in business with a steady stream of money and weapons.


New York Times, December 12, 2010: Hajji Juma Khan, a drug lord, had been on US payroll. At the height of his power, Mr. Juma Khan was secretly flown to Washington for a series of clandestine meetings with C.I.A. and D.E.A. officials in 2006. Even then, the United States was receiving reports that he was on his way to becoming Afghanistan’s most important narcotics trafficker by taking over the drug operations of his rivals and paying off Taliban leaders and corrupt politicians in President Hamid Karzai’s government. (Photo: http://islam.vim.im/juma-khan)But what the government did not say was that Mr. Juma Khan was also a longtime American informer, who provided information about the Taliban, Afghan corruption and other drug traffickers. Central Intelligence Agency officers and Drug Enforcement Administration agents relied on him as a valued source for years, even as he was building one of Afghanistan’s biggest drug operations after the United States-led invasion of the country, according to current and former American officials. Along the way, he was also paid a large amount of cash by the United States.

At the height of his power, Mr. Juma Khan was secretly flown to Washington for a series of clandestine meetings with C.I.A. and D.E.A. officials in 2006. Even then, the United States was receiving reports that he was on his way to becoming Afghanistan’s most important narcotics trafficker by taking over the drug operations of his rivals and paying off Taliban leaders and corrupt politicians in President Hamid Karzai’s government.

In a series of videotaped meetings in Washington hotels, Mr. Juma Khan offered tantalizing leads to the C.I.A. and D.E.A., in return for what he hoped would be protected status as an American asset, according to American officials. And then, before he left the United States, he took a side trip to New York to see the sights and do some shopping, according to two people briefed on the case.

The relationship between the United States government and Mr. Juma Khan is another illustration of how the war on drugs and the war on terrorism have sometimes collided, particularly in Afghanistan, where drug dealing, the insurgency and the government often overlap.

To be sure, American intelligence has worked closely with figures other than Mr. Juma Khan suspected of drug trade ties, including Ahmed Wali Karzai, the president’s half brother, and Hajji Bashir Noorzai, who was arrested in 2005. Mr. Karzai has denied being involved in the drug trade.

A Shifting Policy

Afghan drug lords have often been useful sources of information about the Taliban. But relying on them has also put the United States in the position of looking the other way as these informers ply their trade in a country that by many accounts has become a narco-state.

The case of Mr. Juma Khan also shows how counternarcotics policy has repeatedly shifted during the nine-year American occupation of Afghanistan, getting caught between the conflicting priorities of counterterrorism and nation building, so much so that Mr. Juma Khan was never sure which way to jump, according to officials who spoke on the condition that they not be identified.

When asked about Mr. Juma Khan’s relationship with the C.I.A., a spokesman for the spy agency said that the “C.I.A. does not, as a rule, comment on matters pending before U.S. courts.” A D.E.A. spokesman also declined to comment on his agency’s relationship with Mr. Juma Khan.

His New York lawyer, Steven Zissou, denied that Mr. Juma Khan had ever supported the Taliban or worked for the C.I.A.

“There have been many things said about Hajji Juma Khan,” Mr. Zissou said, “and most of what has been said, including that he worked for the C.I.A., is false. What is true is that H. J. K. has never been an enemy of the United States and has never supported the Taliban or any other group that threatens Americans.”

A spokeswoman for the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, which is handling Mr. Juma Khan’s prosecution, declined to comment.

However, defending the relationship, one American official said, “You’re not going to get intelligence in a war zone from Ward Cleaver or Florence Nightingale.”

At first, Mr. Juma Khan, an illiterate trafficker in his mid-50s from Afghanistan’s remote Nimroz Province, in the border region where southwestern Afghanistan meets both Iran and Pakistan, was a big winner from the American-led invasion. He had been a provincial drug smuggler in southwestern Afghanistan in the 1990s, when the Taliban governed the country. But it was not until after the Taliban’s ouster that he rose to national prominence, taking advantage of a record surge in opium production in Afghanistan after the invasion.

Briefly detained by American forces after the 2001 fall of the Taliban, he was quickly released, even though American officials knew at the time that he was involved in narcotics trafficking, according to several current and former American officials. During the first few years of its occupation of Afghanistan, the United States was focused entirely on capturing or killing leaders of Al Qaeda, and it ignored drug trafficking, because American military commanders believed that policing drugs got in the way of their core counterterrorism mission.

Opium and heroin production soared, and the narcotics trade came to account for nearly half of the Afghan economy.

Concerns, but No Action

By 2004, Mr. Juma Khan had gained control over routes from southern Afghanistan to Pakistan’s Makran Coast, where heroin is loaded onto freighters for the trip to the Middle East, as well as overland routes through western Afghanistan to Iran and Turkey. To keep his routes open and the drugs flowing, he lavished bribes on all the warring factions, from the Taliban to the Pakistani intelligence service to the Karzai government, according to current and former American officials.

The scale of his drug organization grew to stunning levels, according to the federal indictment against him. It was in both the wholesale and the retail drug businesses, providing raw materials for other drug organizations while also processing finished drugs on its own.

Bush administration officials first began to talk about him publicly in 2004, when Robert B. Charles, then the assistant secretary of state for international narcotics and law enforcement, told Time magazine that Mr. Juma Khan was a drug lord “obviously very tightly tied to the Taliban.”

Such high-level concern did not lead to any action against Mr. Juma Khan. But Mr. Noorzai, one of his rivals, was lured to New York and arrested in 2005, which allowed Mr. Juma Khan to expand his empire.

In a 2006 confidential report to the drug agency reviewed by The New York Times, an Afghan informer stated that Mr. Juma Khan was working with Ahmed Wali Karzai, the political boss of southern Afghanistan, to take control of the drug trafficking operations left behind by Mr. Noorzai. Some current and former American counternarcotics officials say they believe that Mr. Karzai provided security and protection for Mr. Juma Khan’s operations.

Mr. Karzai denied any involvement with the drug trade and said that he had never met Mr. Juma Khan. “I have never even seen his face,” he said through a spokesman. He denied having any business or security arrangement with him. “Ask them for proof instead of lies,” he added.

Mr. Juma Khan’s reported efforts to take over from Mr. Noorzai came just as he went to Washington to meet with the C.I.A. and the drug agency, former American officials say. By then, Mr. Juma Khan had been working as an informer for both agencies for several years, officials said. He had met repeatedly with C.I.A. officers in Afghanistan beginning in 2001 or 2002, and had also developed a relationship with the drug agency’s country attaché in Kabul, former American officials say.

He had been paid large amounts of cash by the United States, according to people with knowledge of the case. Along with other tribal leaders in his region, he was given a share of as much as $2 million in payments to help oppose the Taliban. The payments are said to have been made by either the C.I.A. or the United States military.

The 2006 Washington meetings were an opportunity for both sides to determine, in face-to-face talks, whether they could take their relationship to a new level of even longer-term cooperation.

“I think this was an opportunity to drill down and see what he would be able to provide,” one former American official said. “I think it was kind of like saying, ‘O.K., what have you got?’ ”

Business, Not Ideology

While the C.I.A. wanted information about the Taliban, the drug agency had its own agenda for the Washington meetings — information about other Afghan traffickers Mr. Juma Khan worked with, as well as contacts on the supply lines through Turkey and Europe.

One reason the Americans could justify bringing Mr. Juma Khan to Washington was that they claimed to have no solid evidence that he was smuggling drugs into the United States, and there were no criminal charges pending against him in this country.

It is not clear how much intelligence Mr. Juma Khan provided on other drug traffickers or on the Taliban leadership. But the relationship between the C.I.A. and the D.E.A. and Mr. Juma Khan continued for some time after the Washington sessions, officials say.

In fact, when the drug agency contacted him again in October 2008 to invite him to another meeting, he went willingly, believing that the Americans wanted to continue the discussions they had with him in Washington. He even paid his own way to Jakarta, Indonesia, to meet with the agency, current and former officials said.

But this time, instead of enjoying fancy hotels and friendly talks, Mr. Juma Khan was arrested and flown to New York, and this time he was not allowed to go shopping.

It is unclear why the government decided to go after Mr. Juma Khan. Some officials suggest that he never came through with breakthrough intelligence. Others say that he became so big that he was hard to ignore, and that the United States shifted its priorities to make pursuing drug dealers a higher priority.

The Justice Department has used a 2006 narco-terrorism law against Mr. Juma Khan, one that makes it easier for American prosecutors to go after foreign drug traffickers who are not smuggling directly into the United States if the government can show they have ties to terrorist organizations.

The federal indictment shows that the drug agency eventually got a cooperating informer who could provide evidence that Mr. Juma Khan was making payoffs to the Taliban to keep his drug operation going, something intelligence operatives had known for years.

The federal indictment against Mr. Juma Khan said the payments were “in exchange for protection for the organization’s drug trafficking operations.” The alleged payoffs were what linked him to the Taliban and permitted the government to make its case.

But even some current and former American counternarcotics officials are skeptical of the government’s claims that Mr. Juma Khan was a strong supporter of the Taliban.

“He was not ideological,” one former official said. “He made payments to them. He made payments to government officials. It was part of the business.”

Now, plea negotiations are quietly under way. A plea bargain might keep many of the details of his relationship to the United States out of the public record.

Category: Warlords, US-NATO, Drugs, Corruption - Views: 4036




Read more: http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2010/12/12/jailed-afghan-drug-lord-was-informer-on-u-s-payroll.html#ixzz2G8udSXjx

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10.12.2008: The CIA and Drugs
24.11.2008: CIA, Heroin Still Rule Day in Afghanistan
05.05.2008: Rampant depression, drugs scar Afghan population
17.02.2008: Russian state TV suggests USA involved in drug-trafficking from Afghanistan
21.07.2007: Britain is protecting the biggest heroin crop of all time



Read more: http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2010/12/12/jailed-afghan-drug-lord-was-informer-on-u-s-payroll.html#ixzz2G8vEws30

( The New York Times )

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Washington state lights up as smoking marijuana becomes legal


Washington state has become the first in America to allow the recreational use of cannabis, setting up a potential showdown with the US federal government.
Washington state lights up as smoking marijuana becomes legal
Possession of marijuana became legal in Washington state Photo: GETTY IMAGES

By Nick Allen, Los Angeles

December

2012

In the city of Seattle pro-cannabis campaigners celebrated in a haze at the foot of the Space Needle tower at one minute past midnight, the moment the state's new law came into effect.

Vivian McPeak, director of Seattle's annual Hempfest, said: "This is a big day because all our lives we've been living under the iron curtain of prohibition. The whole world sees that prohibition just took a body blow."

The new law only allows cannabis to be smoked inside, and doing so in public is still subject to a $100 fine.

However, the Seattle Police Department told its 1,300 officers that until further notice they shall not issue tickets, and no officers were present at the Space Needle event.

On the city's police website, spokesman Jonah Spangenthal-Lee said: "The department's going to give you a generous grace period to help you adjust to this brave, new, and maybe kinda stoned world we live in."
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He added: "The police department believes that, under state law, you may responsibly get baked, order some pizzas and enjoy a Lord of the Rings marathon in the privacy of your own home, if you want to."

The department also posted a picture of actor Jeff Bridges as the cannabis-smoking character "The Dude" from the comedy film "The Big Lebowski".

Encouraging indoor cannabis smoking, it carried the caption: "The Dude abides, and says, 'take it inside!"

Washington and Colorado became the first two states to decriminalise and regulate the possession of cannabis in ballots held alongside the US presidential election on Nov 6. The Colorado law takes effect on Jan 5.

In Washington it is now legal for adults over the age of 21 to possess an ounce of the drug, or up to 16 ounces of cannabis-infused goods like brownies or cookies, or up to 72 ounces in liquid form.

Growers and processors of cannabis will be regulated and the drug will be sold in licensed shops.

It will be subject to a 25 per cent tax at each stage of that process. The move is expected to bring hundreds of millions of dollars in tax revenue for spending in areas including schools and health care. The establishment of the regulation and tax system will take another year.

However, with cannabis still illegal under United States law, through the Controlled Substances Act, Washington could face a crackdown by federal agents from the FBI and Drug Enforcement Agency.

The drug remains banned from federal property in the state, including military bases and national parks.

Washington's stance comes in the wake of an already escalating conflict between the federal government and states over the burgeoning medical cannabis industry.

The US Attorney's Office has previously launched crackdowns in states, including California, where dispensaries selling cannabis for medical use have proliferated. It has taken legal action to shut down many it believes were operating illegally.

On Wednesday the federal US Attorney's Office in Seattle said that, effectively, nothing had changed. It said: "The department's responsibility to enforce the Controlled Substances Act remains unchanged. Neither states nor the executive branch can nullify a statute passed by Congress."

The US Justice Department has yet to announce whether it will sue in the courts to try to block regulation and taxation of the cannabis industry in Washington and Colorado, which would set up a legal showdown over states' rights.

At the Space Needle, the mostly middle-aged group of cannabis smokers listened to reggae music from loudspeakers.

They included Mike Momany, 61, who said he intended to form a Washington State Cannabis Tourism Association.

Another smoker, calling himself "Professor Gizmo," 50, said: "Victory for hemp. If our forefathers could see us now."

Prosecutors in several areas of Washington said last month that they were dismissing scores of existing cannabis possession cases.

Seattle City Attorney Pete Holmes said: "All we've achieved by prohibition is to fill our jails and make drug dealers quite rich." He added: "We're in uncharted water here."