Multimedia News Jacob Zuma: SA's 'kept' president

Multimedia News Jacob Zuma: SA's 'kept' president SLIDESHOW We list the people the auditors' report identifies as having paid more than R7-million to benefit Jacob Zuma between 1995 and 2006. Zuma payments: South Africans have a right to know 07 DEC 2012 05:00 - NIC DAWES In just over a week, delegates sent to Mangaung by ANC branches will vote whether or not to retain President Jacob Zuma. SPECIAL FOCUS Mangaung 2012: A special report OUR COVERAGE Is Jacob Zuma South Africa's George W Bush? Jacob Zuma's decade of destruction The state of Jacob Zuma MORE COVERAGE Jacob Zuma's approval on shaky ground It is a decade since the Mail & Guardian first revealed that Jacob Zuma was under investigation for corruption and five years since he was elected president of the ANC at Polokwane. Watch our live video with the investigative team behind this story In just over a week, delegates sent to Mangaung by ruling party branches will vote whether or not to retain him in that role, a decision that will determine whether he leads them into the 2014 national election and likely remains president of South Africa until 2019. Read more on the 'kept politician' Secret report reveals how millions flowed to Zuma Zuma corruption: Of battleships and Nkandla Banks bent over backwards for Zuma All the president's willing benefactors: Part one All the president's willing benefactors: Part two Other politicians at the Zuma trough It is a grave decision for the party that was central to our liberation from apartheid and what has been a remarkably successful transition to democracy. We believe it is one that delegates must make with the fullest possible knowledge of each candidate’s suitability for high office. Zuma and those around him have fought, however, to prevent both the courts and the public from learning the truth about the corruption allegations against him and some of his closest associates. In the process they have ridden roughshod over the justice system and put at risk the basic institutional framework of democracy, undermining the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), the courts and intelligence agencies. The KPMG report on Zuma’s financial affairs we are reporting on and posting to our website makes it very difficult for him to continue the charade. It paints the most detailed and distressing picture available of a kept politician, not just unable, but unwilling to live within his means, dependent on an array of benefactors to fund his lifestyle and willing to grant some of them favours in return. The report also makes it clearer than ever that the 2009 decision to drop criminal charges was political rather than legal. As the Sunday Times reported a fortnight ago, prosecutors were confident that their case could withstand the "spy tapes" and the claim that some of his political enemies were trying to manage the timing of the charges to his disadvantage. Reading the report with Judge Hilary Squires’s damning findings in the Schabir Shaik trial, it is hard to disagree with them: the president has an overwhelming case to answer. His supporters may object that in publishing the report now we are "attempting to influence the outcome of Mangaung". We are unabashed, however, in playing what we believe is the proper role of the press - providing the information that enables South Africans to make informed choices in the exercise of their rights. That has not stopped the state from using every tool at its disposal to impose ignorance. When this newspaper sought to show how Zuma’s confidant and spokesperson, Mac Maharaj, had lied under oath to investigators, we were threatened with criminal prosecution and, even though we withheld sensitive information pending court permission to release it, the editor and two journalists now face criminal charges. When the Sunday Times recently sought to publish documents showing how strongly prosecutors had felt about their case against Zuma, it faced an interdict attempt. The Democratic Alliance won a Supreme Court of Appeal order that the NPA hand over the spy tapes so that their relevance to the legality of the decision to drop charges could be properly tested. Months later, both the prosecuting authority and Zuma’s legal team are seeking ways to avoid compliance. We are short-circuiting this process of denial, delay and obfuscation by exposing the entire report to public scrutiny. We are doing so without seeking prior comment from Zuma or others named in it. This is a diversion from our usual practice and it is not one we have undertaken lightly. The right of reply is an important journalistic principle and we ordinarily offer it in advance of publication. In this case we have decided instead to offer full right of reply after publication, because it has been our own experience - and that of other newspapers - in dealing with material emanating from the arms deal investigation that an opportunity to comment is treated by the state as an opportunity to prevent publication. The press code provides that "a publication should seek the views of the subject of serious critical reportage in advance of publication, provided that this need not be done where the publication has reasonable grounds for believing that by doing so it would be prevented from publishing the report, or where evidence might be destroyed or sources intimidated". Although we would have preferred to publish comments from those affected with the report, we are convinced that the risk of being prevented from publishing it at all was real. We are also convinced that the report is a substantial and credible document, based on an assessment of hundreds of thousands of pages of documents obtained by investigating authorities and conducted by experts in forensic accounting. We invite comment from those implicated by the report itself and will publish it on our website immediately. Furthermore, we will publish in print and online detailed responses from Zuma and others identified in our reporting if they are forthcoming. This is what Judge Hilary Squires said at the conclusion of the Shaik trial: "If Zuma could not repay money, how else could he do so than by providing the help of his name and political office as and when it was asked … And Shaik must have foreseen and, by inference, did foresee that if he made these payments Zuma would respond in that way. The conclusion that he realised this, even if only after he started the dependency of Zuma upon his contributions, seems to us to be irresistible." The KPMG report supplements that inference with fresh evidence for which Jacob Zuma has provided no plausible explanation. He must now do so if he wishes to remain in office and avoid prosecution. Should you feel entitled to a right of reply, please email amabhungane@mg.co.za Mail & Guardian All the president's willing benefactors: Part one 07 DEC 2012 05:00 - SAM SOLE, STEFAANS BRÜMMER Here are the people the auditors' report identifies as having paid more than R7-million to benefit Jacob Zuma between 1995 and 2006. SPECIAL FOCUS Jacob Zuma: SA's 'kept' president OUR COVERAGE Banks bent over backwards for Zuma Zuma payments: South Africans have a right to know Auditors' secret report reveals how millions flowed to President Zuma Zuma payments: Of battleships and Nkandla Schabir Shaik – R4 072 500 Schabir Shaik is one of the band of brothers that included ANC underground operatives Moe and Yunis – who served under Jacob Zuma in ANC intelligence – and younger sibling Chippy, who occupied the pivotal position of chief of defence acquisitions during the arms deal. Watch our live video with the investigative team behind this story Prior to democracy, Shaik had been involved in the covert management of ANC funds, which gave him an introduction to the party's then-treasurer, Thomas Nkobi. Read more on the 'kept politician' Zuma corruption: South Africans have a right to know Secret report reveals how millions flowed to Zuma Zuma corruption: Of battleships and Nkandla Banks bent over backwards for Zuma All the president's willing benefactors: Part two After 1994, both Nkobi and Shaik were proponents of the Malaysian Bumiputera model, a concept that entailed the establishment of businesses aligned with a political party. When Nkobi died in September 1994, Shaik found himself shut out by the ANC hierarchy. In May 1995 Nkobi's successor, Makhenkesi Stofile, wrote to Shaik telling him that, after a meeting with ANC officials, he was considered to "have no position within the ANC" and Stofile had been instructed to cut off communication. The KPMG report notes: "It is during this time when the name of Zuma started surfacing in documents at our disposal … Shaik ceased to act on behalf of the ANC (in an official capacity) but continued his business dealings under the name of the Nkobi group, involving Zuma in various instances." It was then that Shaik also began to style himself variously as Zuma's "financial adviser" and "economic adviser". Zuma, fresh from exile and with a large and growing collection of dependants, was open to Shaik's assistance. The first payment to Zuma took place on October 25 1995 – and the KPMG report traces how a pattern of mutual favours developed. KPMG notes: "It is evident that Zuma … at various points, and especially with regard to the relationship of the Nkobi group with the Thomson group of companies, attended meetings and visits with representatives of the Nkobi group on issues that were of interest to the Nkobi group." With his brother Chippy heading defence acquisition, Shaik was well placed to benefit from the decision in the 1990s to re-equip the navy. Early on, he sought an alliance with the French defence conglomerate Thomson-CSF. Thomson was also seeking access to and business from the new ANC elite. The KPMG report sketches how cynically the French calculated their success, which they believed would be dependent on pleasing the politicians and choosing the "right" local partners. And the abrasive Shaik was vulnerable. Parallel to its relationship with him, Thomson was wooing Reuel Khoza's CNI group, perceived to be more favoured by Thabo Mbeki, then the deputy president. Zuma was Shaik's trump card and, as the report makes clear, he shamelessly used his proximity to Zuma to cajole or bully his way into deals. Zuma's key interventions came in July 1998 when he accompanied Shaik to a meeting in London with one of Thomson's top executives to reassure the French of Shaik's suitability – and later in Durban, where he was present when the formal allocation to Nkobi of a shareholding in Thomson was confirmed. In turn, Zuma was not shy about taking advantage of the financial resources Shaik provided (sometimes grudgingly, given his own precarious cash position). By way of illustration: Zuma's reliance on funding from Shaik grew from one payment of R3 500 in 1995 to 176 payments totalling R534 858 in 2004 and, finally, 61 payments totalling R819 333 in the first six months of 2005, ending just after Shaik's conviction for bribery. The total over 10 years: R4 072 500 By then, the real ambivalence of the Zuma-Shaik relationship had been captured in a way not even KPMG's figures can match. Shaik's secretary testified that her boss had complained about "politicians", exclaiming one day that he "has to carry a jar of Vaseline because he gets fucked all the time, but that's okay because he gets what he wants and they get want they want". Nelson Mandela – R1-million-plus Jacob Zuma seems to have been identified fairly early on as a financial "problem child" by Nelson Mandela. The KPMG report quotes from a 1998 internal Absa memo when the bank was considering taking on Zuma, then the ANC deputy president, as a client. The memo referred to the supposed fact that Zuma had been disciplined by Mandela and then-ANC treasurer Mendi Msimang over the conduct of his financial affairs. It also stated that Mandela had apparently agreed to settle Zuma's debts – "this info to be handled strictly confidential". "The source of the payment could not be disclosed to us at this stage. The amount to be paid will be R1.5-million," the Absa memo said. However, no funding appears to have been received from Mandela until October 2000, when the then retired president endorsed a R2-million cheque to Zuma. R1-million of that was destined as a donation to the charitable education trust Zuma had founded and was duly paid over by Zuma. Whether the other R1-million was intended for Zuma's personal benefit is unclear. Zuma issued a cheque for R1-million to an account in the name of the Development Africa Trust that had been opened by Durban businessperson Vivian Reddy. As the Shaik trial revealed, around this time Reddy became involved in funding Zuma's Nkandla estate development. But Shaik, who controlled Zuma's accounts, stopped the payment to Development Africa, instead using Mandela's money to plug holes in his own company accounts. Shaik eventually repaid R900 000 to Development Africa – partly using R250 000 that was found to have been paid in terms of the "bribe agreement" allegedly reached between Shaik, French arms company Thomson-CSF and Zuma. Shaik completed the repayment with a R400 000 cheque to Development Africa on June 23 2005. It was striking for two reasons: There was an outflow only days later of the same amount of R400 000 from Development Africa to the International Convention Centre in Durban, where it was accepted as payment on behalf of Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini for his daughter's wedding – tending to confirm allegations that Development Africa was used at least in part as a slush fund to buy the king's favour for the ANC; and On the same day, June 23 2005, a new R1-million cheque from Mandela was deposited into Zuma's Absa cheque account, wiping out his known overdrafts, which stood at more than R400 000 at the end of the previous year. At least from this Mandela million, it appears, Zuma could benefit personally. The new R1-million from Mandela came only nine days after then-president Mbeki had dismissed Zuma as his deputy following Shaik's corruption conviction. Jurgen Kögl – R107 5091 An enigmatic broker and investor originally from Namibia, Jurgen Kögl has counted a number of politicians as close friends. They included Mbeki, who stayed in his Hillbrow flat after returning from exile, and Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, the former opposition leader. Like Shaik, Kögl has been described as a "financial adviser" to Zuma. In a 2003 interview with the Mail & Guardian, he justified sponsoring politicians, saying: "There is nothing sinister about these relationships. What happens is that you provide support and find ways of making sure these guys are able to get on with negotiations or with governing the country." The KPMG report identifies Kögl's investment management company, Cay Nominees, as the source of about a dozen payments totalling R1075091 to, or on behalf of, Zuma. The single biggest payment –R600 000 into the bond account of a Killarney, Johannesburg, flat owned by Zuma – raised much interest from KPMG and Scorpions investigators, who appear to have suspected it was disguised bribe money from French arms company Thomson-CSF. The Kögl payments include: May 5 1995: R40 000 deposit for Zuma's R426 500 purchase of the Killarney flat (which appears to have been subsequently occupied by his wife Kate, who committed suicide in December 2000, and their children); February 22 and March 5 1999: Two payments of R20 000 each to a Zuma account with Mercedes-Benz Finance for a Mercedes-Benz E-Class 230. Zuma had been in arrears since buying the vehicle the year before and Mercedes had issued a summons; June 9 1999: R40 000 to a Zuma cheque account; June 17 1999: R50 000 to Zuma's bond account for the Killarney flat. This is the day after Zuma was inaugurated as deputy president. The bond account had been habitually in arrears since at least 1997, towards the end of which Standard Bank obtained a debt judgment and nearly sold the flat in execution; August 15 2001: R183 000 to Zuma's account for the Mercedes E230. This was to settle the account in full after it had again fallen into serious arrears following Kögl's February and March 1999 bailouts; and August 23 2001: R600 000 to Zuma's bond account for the Killarney flat. This was to pay the bulk of the outstanding amount after Zuma had made no further payments since Kögl's June 1999 bailout. KPMG presents a trail appearing to show that the payments of R183 000 and R600 000 flowed from a R1.19-million transfer to Kögl's Cay Nominees from a client account at a British law firm. The audit firm speculates that the payment might have been "another structure for transferring funds" from Thomson-CSF after only the first R250 000 tranche of the R500 000-a-year French bribe had reached Shaik through a sham "service provider" contract six months earlier. The Scorpions appear to have abandoned attempts to force disclosure of the money's source in London when Kögl and Zuma went to court to stop them in 2007. When the parliamentary ethics committee investigated Zuma in 2003 for allegedly not declaring benefits, Kögl and Zuma claimed to the committee that the R656 000 known by then to have passed from the former to the latter was an interest-bearing loan repayable after 10 years. KPMG states: "We could not identify any loan agreement between Zuma and Cay Nominees." * Got a tip-off for us about this story? Email amabhungane@mg.co.za The M&G Centre for Investigative Journalism (amaBhungane) produced this story. All views are ours. See www.amabhungane.co.za for our stories, activities and funding sources. Mail & Guardian All the president's willing benefactors: Part two 07 DEC 2012 05:00 - SAM SOLE, STEFAANS BRÜMMER Here are the people the auditors' report identifies as having paid more than R7-million to benefit Jacob Zuma between 1995 and 2006. SPECIAL FOCUS Jacob Zuma: SA's 'kept' president OUR COVERAGE Road to Mangaung: How Zuma won Mangaung votes Auditors' secret report reveals how millions flowed to President Zuma Zuma payments: Of battleships and Nkandla Banks bent over backwards for Zuma Zuma payments: South Africans have a right to know Julie Mahomed – R431 000 Julekha "Julie" Mahomed was Zuma's lawyer. It was she who testified in Shaik's trial about his payments to Zuma being covered by an interest-bearing "revolving loan agreement". Watch our live video with the investigative team behind this story The KPMG report reveals that among the documents the Scorpions had seized was one that suggested someone was considering using Mahomed's trust account to transfer money from France. Read more on the 'kept politician' Zuma corruption: South Africans have a right to know Secret report reveals how millions flowed to Zuma Zuma corruption: Of battleships and Nkandla Banks bent over backwards for Zuma All the president's willing benefactors: Part one Other politicians at the Zuma trough A hand-drawn diagram on the back of an unrelated October 2000 account from the University of Zululand reflected the following plan: "R1m from Paris to Mauritius. From Mauritius to A Moodley Trust a/c and then to Juli's Trust a/c." Anand Moodley was Shaik's attorney and, KPMG says, it is possible that "Juli" referred to Mahomed. On July 12 2004 Zuma issued a cheque in favour of his Nkandla builder, Eric Malengret, for R120 000. KPMG reveals that a credit transfer of R120 000 was made into Zuma's account the same day. The funds originated from the J Mahomed Attorneys trust account. The source of the funds is unknown. On August 12 2004 Zuma issued a cheque in favour of Malengret for R30 000. Two credits, totalling R30 000, were transferred into Zuma's account the same day, R20 000 from Mahomed's firm's trust account and R10 000 from its business account. The sources of the funds are unknown, says KPMG. It appears that Zuma may also have benefited – through Mahomed's trust account – from another arms deal company, Ferrostaal, which led the consortium that won the submarine contract. On July 6 2005, a R281 000 cheque, drawn on her trust account, was deposited into a Wesbank account to make up Zuma's arrear payments on a Mitsubishi Pajero 4x4. According to KPMG, it appears the funds came to Mahomed through three similar deposits into another of her accounts, two of which bore the reference "Ferroman". Ferroman was a local Ferrostaal subsidiary with a black economic empowerment component. Mahomed herself was a director of Ferroman, which was intended to be a vehicle for pursuing Ferrostaal's offset obligations arising out of the submarine deal. Vivian Reddy – R324 110 Durban businessperson Vivian Reddy appears to have become involved in funding Zuma's Nkandla development when financial pressures made it difficult for Shaik's companies to pay. On November 3 2000, Reddy lent R50 000 to Zuma's builder, Eric Malengret. KPMG notes: "We understand that Reddy indicated that the funds had been advanced to Malengret as a result of cashflow problems Malengret experienced due to the development for Zuma and due to Zuma's tardiness in reimbursing him for work completed." Reddy later also stepped in to assist Zuma with arranging a home loan from First National Bank. According to KPMG, Zuma applied to FNB for a home loan on June 7 2002 in the amount of R650 000. "V Reddy" was indicated as having accepted responsibility to pay the monthly instalments. A fortnight later, Reddy also signed a suretyship, binding himself for up to R400 000 should Zuma default. FNB confirmed to Reddy on December 12 that the bond over the property had been registered in the amount of R900 000. The loan was repayable over 20 years at R12 117 a month – and it was noted that the debit order would be raised against Reddy's cheque account. KPMG found Reddy serviced the bond account until May 25 2005, when Zuma took over the payments. The value of the payments until then was R274 110. On April 8 2006, the outstanding balance on the bond was R854 229. Zuma did attempt to begin to repay Reddy in 2004 – but he needed help (See Khulubuse Zuma). Reddy has said publicly that he has been repaid in full. In response to the Nkandla public- works scandal, Zuma recently told Parliament: "I engaged the banks and I am still paying a bond on the first phase of my home." It seems likely that the president was referring to the loan from FNB. Khulubuse Zuma – R180 000 On October 30 2004, Jacob Zuma issued a cheque in favour of Reddy for R164 500 to repay the latter for servicing Zuma's bond repayments on the Nkandla development. The bank returned the cheque as unpaid, because Zuma's account was already R163 170 in the red. In February 2005, KPMG's report says, Zuma's now controversial businessperson nephew came to his aid. Zuma's cheque account revealed a R180 000 deposit on February 26 2005 with the reference "Khulubuse". "Before this deposit," KPMG says, "Zuma's account indicated an overdraft balance of R91704. The deposit slip indicates that a cheque in the name of KC Zuma was deposited. We understand that the cheque was drawn on the account of Khulubuse Clive Zuma." Thereafter, Zuma issued seven post-dated cheques to Reddy, totalling R180 000. Khulubuse's ventures into big business – especially his involvement in Aurora Empowerment Systems' disastrous takeover of gold mines on the Rand – have been controversial. His early support for Zuma begs the question whether this past financial relationship generated any degree of presidential access or protection. Nora Fakude-Nkuna – R174 200 When Parliament's ethics committee investigated Zuma's alleged non-declaration of interests in 2003, it was presented with evidence that Bohlabela Wheels, the company of Nelspruit businessperson Nora Fakude-Nkuna, a longtime friend of Zuma, had paid the architects' fees for the then deputy president's Nkandla estate. The invoice for R34 200 was dated March 2000. In reply, Zuma and his nephew Kusa Raymond Zuma, who worked for Bohlabelo Wheels, said Kusa was responsible for the payment and had organised it with Fakude-Nkuna without Zuma's knowledge. KPMG shows further payments: August 14 2000: "KR Zuma" deposits R100 000 into the account of Zuma's Nkandla builder, Malengret. But the deposit comprises two cheques drawn on Bohlabela Wheels and one from Fakude-Nkuna. October 4 2000: "KR Zuma" makes another cheque deposit of R40000 and the details reflected in the deposit slip indicate that the drawer's name was Bohlabela Wheels. Replying to questions on these payments in the 2003 Parliamentary investigation, Zuma "indicated that there was a verbal agreement between him and Fukude and that it was not an interest-free loan", says KPMG. * Got a tip-off for us about this story? Email amabhungane@mg.co.za The M&G Centre for Investigative Journalism (amaBhungane) produced this story. All views are ours. See www.amabhungane.co.za for our stories, activities and funding sources. Mail & Guardian Zuma payments: Of battleships and Nkandla 07 DEC 2012 05:00 - SAM SOLE, STEFAANS BRÜMMER The financing of the Nkandla project makes it clear that Jacob Zuma's home is built on shaky foundations of friends and would-be favours. SPECIAL FOCUS Jacob Zuma: SA's 'kept' president OUR COVERAGE Editorial: ANC purges won't bring stability Nkandla: Documents call Zuma's bluff Nkandla: What's in the name of a country estate? M&G asks court for access to Nkandla money details Jacob Zuma's Nkandla ­homestead was born in arms-deal sin. The ongoing saga of the construction, financing and outfitting of the president's rural seat captures the mixture of chaos, influence and excess that seems to characterise Zuma's relationship with money – and with his many benefactors. Watch our live video with the investigative team behind this story And, of course, the story of Nkandla also weaves in the thick strand of graft introduced by the notorious "encrypted fax", which alleged that Zuma and Schabir Shaik had concluded a secret bribe agreement with French defence company Thomson-CSF. Read more on the 'kept politician' Zuma corruption: South Africans have a right to know Secret report reveals how millions flowed to Zuma Banks bent over backwards for Zuma All the president's willing benefactors: Part one All the president's willing benefactors: Part two Other politicians at the Zuma trough The history of the Nkandla development set out in the report by audit firm KPMG prepared for Zuma's trial is striking for how many people were involved in paying for it before the president spent a cent. It was Zuma's close friend, Mpumulanga businessperson Nora Fakude-Nkuna, who first approached architects on his behalf in February 2000 and it was her company, Bohlabela Wheels, that paid the R34 200 bill. Indeed, it is a mystery how Zuma expected to be able to pay for the project at all, because his monthly living expenses were already more than double his monthly income – unless, of course, he was expecting a new cash injection. That is the view KPMG takes of the meeting between Zuma, Shaik and Thomson's South African boss, Alain Thetard, which took place on about March 10 2000 in Durban. The meeting was captured in Thetard's March 17 2 000 encrypted fax to his bosses in Paris setting out what transpired. Thetard wrote that he had asked Shaik to obtain a "clear confirmation" from Zuma, or "at least an encoded declaration" to "validate" a request made by Shaik at the end of September 1999. Thetard indicated that he had defined a code and Zuma had given the coded confirmation. Thetard reminded his bosses of the two main objectives of the "effort" they were being asked to make: "Thomson-CSF's protection during the current [arms deal] investigation" and "JZ's permanent support for future projects". An "effort" of R500 000 a year was indicated. Shaik told his trial this meeting was about a donation to Zuma's charitable education trust, an explanation rejected by the court. In February 2003, Zuma denied to Parliament such a meeting had taken place. In any event, Zuma's builder, Eric Malengret, started on the Nkandla project in about July 2000. The agreed price was R1340 000. Events proceeded as follows: August 14 2000 R100 000 sourced from Bohlabela and Fakude-Nkuna is deposited to Malengret's company account by Zuma's nephew, Kusa; October 4 2000 R40 000 more arrives from Bohlabela; October 6 2000 Shaik writes to Thetard regarding "the subject matter agreed by ourselves in Pretoria … Several months later no real action. I share the sentiment with my party that he feels let down." Shaik adds that this is "particularly unpleasing" as "my party" had "proceeded to an advanced stage on a certain sensitive matter"; October 17 2000 – former president Nelson Mandela's R2-million cheque lands in Zuma's account. On the same date Zuma, apparently by agreement with Mandela, issues a cheque for R1-million to Zuma's charitable education trust; October 18 2000 an unidentified person, named only as "Sew", deposits R50 000 in notes to Malengret's account for Nkandla. The same day, Shaik transfers R900 000 out of Zuma's account to settle some of Zuma's debt to the Nkobi group. An amount of R100 000 is left to reduce Zuma's overdraft. Shaik is apparently un-aware that the R1-million is intended for the Development Africa Trust; October 19 2000 Shaik confirms in writing his instruction to Malengret the previous day to halt construction on the Nkandla residence. Malengret later testified that Shaik had exclaimed: "Does he [Zuma] think money grows on trees?"; November 2000 Vivian Reddy enters the scene, lending Malengret R50 000 to ease his cash-flow problems owing to Zuma's tardiness in reimbursing him for work completed; December 6 2000 Zuma tries to write a cheque for R1-million in favour of the Development Africa Trust, ­apparently unaware that Shaik has moved the funds; December 7 2000 Shaik instructs the bank to stop payment of the Zuma cheque, but now presumably realises he needs to repay Development Africa; December 8 2000 Shaik faxes to Thetard an application form for a "service provider agreement" involving four tranches of R250 000. The Shaik trial later ruled the agreement was a sham to disguise payments from Thomson. In his covering letter, Shaik writes: "Kindly expedite our arrangement as soon as possible, as matters are becoming extremely urgent with my client"; February 16 2001 R249 725 from Thomson is deposited into Shaik's Kobitech company account; February 28 2001 A Kobitech cheque for R250 000 is deposited with Development Africa. Shaik issues three more postdated cheques for R250 000, but they are eventually stopped. Shaik repays Development Africa only much later; October 9 2001 The Scorpions launch search raids in Durban, France and Mauritius; June 7 2002 Zuma applies to FNB for a bond for Nkandla, assisted by Reddy; December 12 2002 FNB confirms to Reddy that the bond over the property has been registered in an amount of R900 000; January 25 2003 The first debit order to service the FNB bond is debited against Reddy's account for an amount of R12 117; June 2 2005 Shaik is convicted of corruption; June 14 2005 Mbeki fires Zuma as deputy president; June 20 2005 the National Prosecuting Authority announces it will charge Zuma; June 23 2005 Mandela ­transfers R1-million to Zuma; and June 25 2005 Zuma makes his first bond payment for Nkandla. * Got a tip-off for us about this story? Email amabhungane@mg.co.za The M&G Centre for Investigative Journalism (amaBhungane) produced this story. All views are ours. See www.amabhungane.co.za for our stories, activities and funding sources. Mail & Guardian - - - - - - - COMMENTS BY SONNY - - ....and then they call "MALEMA A FRAUDSTER?" If this man qualified for a second term in office, then MALEMA should be deputy President.......? What has happened to Shabir Shaik and his undying love for his PRESIDENT? NO WONDER SOUTH AFRICA'S CORRUPTION RATINGS ARE SO HIGH! ......."When I open my mouth to speak, I'll tell you the first lie!"....... Is there "ONE" ANC politician who is worth his/her salt? WE DON'T THINK SO!! BRITANNIA HAS FAILED AFRICA SINCE 1797.