Wednesday, December 26, 2012

Salute...Green Boots.... Koevoet !

Koevoet Story
The Covert War is compelling reading. In 1978 the counter-insurgency war on the Angolan/SWA Namibian border was going badly for the South Africans. Externally the SADF was in control, but internally SWAPO was gaining the upper hand. The SAP Commissioner and SADF Chief met to find a solution. They decided to form a joint 5-Recce Commando/Security Branch organisation on the lines of the Rhodesian Selous Scouts. A highly experienced Security Branch officer, Col ‘Sterk’ [strong] Hans’ Dreyer, was despatched to Owamboland with five police officers. They were tasked under‘Top Secret’ Project Koevoet (crowbar) to find and provide operational intelligence for the Recces. But they needed the Recces to provide captures for interrogation, but they were heavily engaged in operations in Angola. Col Dreyer came to realise that the situation in SWA/Namibia was completely different to the Rhodesian scene. What worked in Rhodesia wouldn’t necessarily work there. So his team reverted to basic police work, building informer networks and so on. A single arrest led to the smashing of SWAPO’s sabotage networks throughout the country. During one investigation three policemen, armed only with pistols, almost blundered into a large PLAN group which would have spelt their certain death. This narrow escape resulted in the recruitment of black special constables into units to protect the investigators. This led to a realisation of the astonishing tracking abilities of the Owambos. While tracking has been a tactic used by the military since time eternal, it had never become a strategy where it was always used — which is what happened with Koevoet. It led to the unit’s major expansion. As with other insurgencies in southern Africa, the Security Forces were faced with a serious landmine threat. This problem for Koevoet was overcome when it was equipped with the remarkable mine-protected Casspirs. Combining their police investigational abilities and skills at getting information, the tracking abilities of their special constables, the landmine protection provided by their Casspirs — with the support of SAAF helicopter gunships — Koevoet emerged as the premier counter-insurgency unit in SWA/Namibia. It cut bloody swathes through PLAN’s internal organisation and tellingly acted in support of the army in southern Angola. In its ten year existence it fought in 1 615 contacts and killed or captured 3 225 PLAN soldiers — the equivalent of almost six battalions of troops. But it paid a high price in blood and lost almost 160 policemen killed in action with another 949 wounded — more grievous casualties than any other South African fighting unit since World War II. After heroically repelling SWAPO’s invasion of Namibia in April 1989 — while fighting under the direct authority of the Secretary-General of the United Nations — the unit was ignominiously disbanded and its black members disgracefully abandoned to take their chances at the unforgiving hands of their former SWAPO foes. While this book is expressly focused on Koevoet, it is also the first full story of the internal border war in Namibia. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------


Koevoet (pronounced [ˈkuːfut]) (Afrikaans and Dutch for crowbar), also known as Operation K and officially denoted as the South West Africa Police Counter-Insurgency Unit (SWAPOL-COIN), was a paramilitary-trained police counter insurgency unit in South-West Africa during the Namibian Independence War. ("Crowbar" was an allusion to Koevoet's mission of prying insurgents from the local population).

The unit is presently considered one of the most effective fighting forces deployed against communist-backed SWAPO liberation fighters during apartheid, although it remained notorious for committing acts of brutality against civilians.


1 History

1.1 International Background

1.2 South African Border War

1.3 Formation

2 Structure

3 Training

4 Tactics

5 Disbanding

6 See also

7 Further reading

8 Footnotes

9 References

10 External links


International Background

See also: History of Namibia and Decolonization of Africa

At the end of World War I, the former German South-West Africa was granted to South Africa as a mandated territory through the League of Nations. By the 1960s, however, much of Africa was embroiled in a struggle for independence from colonial powers such as Belgium, Great Britain, France, and Portugal. In the southern subcontinent, where many indigenous tribes had been pushed off their lands by settled Europeans, the political situation was particularly explosive. Then governed by its apartheid administration, South Africa watched with concern as low intensity conflicts and guerrilla warfare in neighbouring countries ousted traditional white regimes, often replacing them with Marxist-oriented single party states such as those in Zambia, Angola, and Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia).

Determined to prevent South-West Africa from following this example, South African authorities stepped up their efforts to retain control over their protectorate. When the League of Nations was dissolved with World War II and replaced by the United Nations in 1945, Pretoria refused to recognise the new Trusteeship Council for mandates. Instead, Jan Christiaan Smuts' administration insisted on the right to annexation. In 1950, the UN confirmed that South Africa's legal administration was still in force and that it could not officially compel the latter to open a new trusteeship agreement.Even after the General Assembly officially assumed its powers as successor to the old League and revoked the mandate in 1966, South-West Africa remained a de-facto "fifth province" of its larger neighbour.

South African Border War

Main article: South African Border War

The Namibian Independence War (and its related border conflicts) began when the South West African People's Organisation commenced its armed struggle against what it termed an illegal occupation of South-West Africa. Disappointed that the UN had failed to take decisive executive action to ensure independence, SWAPO, a prominent independentist group, declared from its Tanzania offices that "We have no alternative but to rise in arms and bring about our liberation." This did not come as a surprise to many observers, who pointed out that as early as 1962 the organisation had already announced that violence was necessary as part of an overall strategy seeking change - a decision which allowed authorities to legitimately brand known members as terrorists.

In 26 August, 1966, the first military engagement was fought when armed SWAPO guerrillas clashed with South African security forces in Ovamboland. A month later, a second SWAPO raid was attempted on a major administrative complex in Oshikango.South Africa soon found herself confronted with frequent attacks on tribal figureheads, government installations, and Grootfontein farming regions - the last of these targets in particular caused consternation among white South-West African civilians.

By 1971, the International Court of Justice had ruled South Africa's occupation of South-West Africa to be illegal under international law.At this point, SWAPO was the most effective nationalist group in the territory. It enjoyed thorough support from South-West Africa's largest tribe, the Ovambo, and guerrillas active with its military wing (self-styled the "People's Liberation Army Namibia") were often indistinguishable from the local population.

From the South African perspective, combating PLAN was part of a counter-terrorist initiative against those who were viewed as pawns of international communism. However, the world community increasingly took the opinion that the conflict was a legitimate bid for national liberation; UN officials unilaterally recognised SWAPO as the "sole authentic representative of the Namibian people" and "the future government of Namibia". Atrocities were already being charged by both sides, with Pretoria condemning SWAPO's systematic attacks on basic infrastructure and indiscriminate use of land mines. The latter retaliated in 1973 by drawing attention to the mistreatment of terrorist suspects in military detention.

Fierce fighting eventually drove ten percent of South-West Africa's population into exile; 69,000 citizens crossed the border into Angolan territory, while another 5,000 fled to Zambia. Among these refugees were potential SWAPO recruits who subsequently sought insurgent training in Arab Africa, the Soviet Union, China, or North Korea. By the late 1970s, contacts between SWAPO and the South African Defence Force averaged one per day; over 900 clashes with nationalist guerrillas were reported each year.

Successful anti-colonial wars elsewhere also had a direct impact on events in South-West Africa.
Victorious liberation movements in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Angola offered varying degrees of material support for SWAPO. The new Angolan regime in particular proved an active benefactor, and permitted PLAN to operate from within their national boundaries.
Deadlier escalation followed in 1978 when the SADF began crossing into Angola to strike at SWAPO positions; such actions were justified as necessary to prevent would-be 'freedom fighters' from infiltrating south into Ovamboland. 60,000 South African soldiers were deployed to the operational area,and defence costs spiraled upwards - eventually consuming a solid ten percent of Pretoria's total expenditure. PLAN responded by deploying increasingly sophisticated weaponry, including rockets, mortars, and an anti-aircraft arsenal of Soviet origin.


In many countries there is a formal separation of duties between civilian law enforcement and the military. The former is generally responsible for domestic issues while the latter is deployed in defence of the nation. At first this philosophy was adopted in South-West Africa. Guerilla operations inside the country were dealt with by the police. Insurgents were seen as common criminals that should be processed by the criminal justice system. However, insurgents used military equipment which normal police officers were not equipped or trained to deal with.

In 1978, Magnus Malan directed the SAP to establish an intelligence gathering paramilitary unit similar to the Selous Scouts.The Selous Scouts was an elite unit that had demonstrated how small units, trained to unusually high levels of expertise, could have an impact disproportionate to their size. Koevoet was founded under the name "Operation K" by Colonel Hans Dreyer, a veteran of the Rhodesian Special Air Service and an avid scholar of counter-insurgency combat. The name "Koevoet" was subsequently popularised by people such as police minister Louis le Grange.

Koevoet was largely based around the Namibia-Angola border and the Caprivi Strip. Most of the recruits were black policemen led by white officers. A few mercenaries and former FNLA/UNITA operatives from Angola were also known to have served in the unit, along with former SWAPO guerillas who were given a chance to serve the South African authorities by joining Koevoet's ranks. Early 1979 saw the first Koevoet operations carried out by ten trained troopers and about sixty local conscripts. These were largely involving surveillance of suspected SWAPO activists, known Communists, and other criminals. By 1980, however, Koevoet had carried out several raids on guerilla camps and engaged in violent firefights with SWAPO fighters. According to the South West African authorities, in that year alone five hundred rebel operatives were killed or arrested by the paramilitary at the cost of only twelve men. By 1984, search and destroy combat operations had taken precedence over intelligence gathering.

A large part of Koevoet's later work included APC patrols into guerilla-held areas. Sometimes mortar attacks were carried out on guerilla camps, followed by armoured assaults. If necessary, a number of the operators would later dismount and pursue the enemy with small arms. Skilled trackers drawn from the local population were also hired to hunt down fugutives sought by the police. Clashes between SWAPO and Koevoet became increasingly costly and fierce; in 1989 official estimates suggested that over three thousand guerilla fighters were being killed or captured each year by the one unit alone. Their use of torture and assassination, however, proved to be their undoing; SWAPO compiled a list of atrocities committed by Koevoet which was promptly released to the international press. Even the South African government finally bowed to pressure and tried several operators for murder. In 1985 heavily armed Koevoet squads indiscriminately opened fire on anti-apartheid protestors in Windhoek.


Koevoet was a +-1000-man force consisting of about 900 Ovambo and about 300 white officers and SAP non-commissioned officers (NCOs). It was organized into 40 to 50-man platoons equipped largely with mine-resistant armored personnel carriers called Casspirs and Wolf Turbo s for conducting patrols, a Duiker fuel truck and a Blesbok supply vehicle (both variants of a Casspir). They rotated one week in the bush for one week at camp.

There were three Koevoet units based in Kaokaland, Kavango, and Ovambo with each unit over several platoons.

Koevet's internal structure was the brainchild of Hans Dreyer (later a Major-General in the SAP) to develop and exploit counter-insurgency intelligence. The concept was originally modeled on the Portuguese Flechas and Rhodesia's Selous Scouts.

By the mid 1980s, certain estimates put Koevoet's size at over a thousand troops.[citation needed] The organization established its formal headquarters in the present day town of Oshakati, Namibia.


The white officers were either South-West African or South-African police officers and, as often as not, untrained for what were effectively military operations. Accordingly, these officers were usually sent for additional training with South African Special Forces Brigade in bushcraft, tracking and small arms handling and tactics.

The Ovambo and Bushman trackers were rated as Special Constables, who essentially underwent intensive basic infantry training although many were captured and "turned" SWAPO fighters that had already received training of a sort elsewhere.

From a Koevoet operator's perspective, Special Constables were "Counter Insurgency" (COIN) (Afrikaans: Teen Insurgensie (TEIN)), while Koevoet operators were Koevoete (meaning plural of Koevoet) and had higher status than Special Constables.

The trackers of the unit in the early days were local Owambu and not Bushmen as often claimed, but operations were conducted with the bushman and paratrooper "bat" units with success. The Owambu, although accepting the skills of the bushmen, were in close competition and were in actual tracking and not just knowledgeable of the habits of the "tracked" equal.


Koevoet operatives learned many of their later tactics during service in the Rhodesian Bush War. A number of the men were originally sent as part of a South African support unit which trained under the BSAP paramilitary. It was because of this past association with the BSAP (Known as the "Black Boots" for their distinctly black footwear) that Koevoet would subsequently be referred to commonly as the "Green Boots". Several members of the former organization were later offered positions in Koevoet following the end of Rhodesia's white minority rule.

Koevoet operations used highly mobile units that tracked groups of SWAPO fighters who were on foot. Their tracks were picked up in various ways, but most often from:[citation needed]

Interrogation of PLAN fighers

Intimidation of local inhabitants

Patrols of areas favoured for crossing by SWAPO fighters

Following up after attacks carried out by SWAPO

Once a suspicious track was found, a vehicle would leap-frog ahead a few kilometres to check for the same tracks, and once found, the other vehicles would race up to join them. Using this technique they could make quickly catch up with the guerillas who were travelling on foot. The technique borrowed strongly from experience gained during the Rhodesian Bush War.

The trackers could provide accurate estimates on the distance to the enemy, the speed at which they were travelling and their states of mind. They were able to do this by "reading" factors such as abandoned equipment, changes from walking to running speed, reduced attempts at anti-tracking or splintering into smaller groups taking different directions ("bomb shelling"). Once the trackers sensed that the SWAPO fighters were close, they would often call in close air support and retreat to the safety of the Casspir armoured personnel carriers to face an enemy typically armed with RPG-7 rocket launchers, rifle grenades, AK-47s, SKS carbines, mines and RPK and PKM machine guns.

Koevoet members were financially rewarded through bounty system, which paid them for kills, prisoners and equipment they captured. This practice allowed many of the members to earn significantly more than their normal salary, and resulted in competition between units. It also resulted in a complaints being raised by the Red Cross about the disproportionately low number of prisoners taken, and accusations of summary executions of prisoners.

Former SADF generals like Constand Viljoen and Jan Geldenhuys were very critical of Koevoet's activities, considering them cruel and crude, and undermining of the army's "hearts and minds" campaign.


SWAPO's accusations that Koevoet had conducted intimidation of voters during registration for the election was taken up by the United Nations. Consequently, in October 1989, Koevoet was disbanded so that SWAPO could not accuse South Africa of influencing the election. Its members were incorporated nationwide into the South West African Police (SWAPOL). A notable percentage of operators were also known to have taken up work with the South-West Africa Territorial Force.

The Koevoet issue was one of the most difficult the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) had to face. Because the unit was formed after the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978 (calling for South Africa's immediate withdrawal from Namibia), it was not mentioned in the eventual settlement proposal or related documents. Once Koevoet's role became clear, the UN Secretary-General took the position that it was a paramilitary unit and, as such, should be disbanded as soon as the settlement proposal took effect. About 2,000 of its members had been absorbed into SWAPOL before the implementation date of April 1, 1989 but they reverted to their former role against the SWAPO insurgents in the "events" of early April 1989. Although ostensibly re-incorporated into SWAPOL in mid-May, the ex-Koevoet personnel continued to operate as a counter-insurgency unit travelling around the north in armoured and heavily armed convoys. In June 1989, the UN Special Representative in Namibia and head of UNTAG, Martti Ahtisaari, told the Administrator-General (South African appointee Louis Pienaar) that this behaviour was inconsistent with the settlement proposal, which required the police to be lightly armed. Some Koevoet operators later maintained that where the SWAPOL-COIN police forces were weakened in order to meet the demand set by the proposal document, SWAPO had not yet relinquished its position and capabilities as an armed insurgent force, thus necessitating their cautious defiance.

The vast majority of the ex-Koevoet personnel were quite unsuited for continued employment in Namibian law enforcement and, if the issue was not dealt with soon, Ahtisaari threatened to dismiss Pienaar.

Ahtisaari's tough stance in respect of these continuing Koevoet operations made him a target of the South African Civil Cooperation Bureau. According to a hearing in September 2000 of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, two CCB operatives (Kobus le Roux and Ferdinand Barnard) were tasked to give the UNTAG leader a "good hiding". To carry out the assault, Barnard had planned to use the grip handle of a metal saw as a knuckleduster. In the event, Ahtisaari did not attend the meeting at the Keetmanshoop Hotel, where Le Roux and Barnard were laying in wait for him, and thus escaped injury.

There ensued a difficult process of negotiation with the South African government which continued for several months. The UN Secretary-General pressed for the removal of all ex-Koevoet elements from SWAPOL, with Ahtisaari bringing to Pienaar's attention many allegations of misconduct by them. UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar visited Namibia in July 1989, following which the UN Security Council demanded that Koevoet formally disarm and the dismantle its command structure. Under such pressure, the South African foreign minister, Pik Botha, announced on September 28, 1989 that some 1,200 ex-Koevoet members of SWAPOL would be demobilized the next day. A further 400 such personnel were demobilized on October 30 - both events were supervised by UNTAG military monitors.

See also

Eugene de Kock, notable former Koevoet operator

Executive Outcomes

Angolan Civil War

South African Border War

32 Battalion

Further reading

Vanneman, Peter (1990). Soviet Strategy in Southern Africa: Gorbachev's Pragmatic Approach. Hoover Press Publications. ISBN 0-8179-8901-3.

Hooper, Jim (1988). Koevoet. Southern Book Publishers. ISBN 1-86812-167-4.

Kamongo, Sisingi; Bezuidenhout, Leon (2011). Shadows in the Sand: A Koevoet Tracker's Story of an Insurgency War. International Pub Marketing. pp. 293. ISBN 0-620-47479-3.

Stiff, P. The Covert War: Koevoet Operations in Namibia 1979-1989, Galago Publishing Pty Ltd, 2000. ISBN 1-919854-03-7

Zhu, Yunxia (1999). "§5: Violence and Intimidation in Namibia". UN Peacekeeping in Action: The Namibian Experience. Nova Publishers. ISBN 1-56072-653-9.


^ Hooper 1988, p. 232.

^ Venter 1994, p. 127-168.

^ Turner 1988.

^ a b c d e f g h Green, Sparks. Namibia: The Nation After Independence. pp. 1-134.

^ a b c d e f g Fryxell, Cole. To Be Born a Nation. pp. 1-200.

^ a b Thomas McGhee, Charles C.; N/A, N/A, eds. (1989). The plot against South Africa (2nd ed.). Pretoria: Varama Publishers. ISBN 0-620-14537-4.

^ "Namibia: Apartheid, resistance and repression (1945-1966)". Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa. August 2009. Retrieved 15 April 2011.

^ Petronella Sibeene (17 April 2009). "Swapo Party Turns 49". New Era.

^ "Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence Of South Africa In Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)". International Court of Justice. 20 April 2012.

^ a b c Forsythe, David. Encyclopedia of Human Rights. pp. 1-21.

^ Bothma, Louis J (2006). Die Buffel Struikel: Die storie van 32 Bataljon en sy mense. LJ Bothma. pp. 383. ISBN 0-620-37296-6.

^ Kamongo, Sisingi (2011). Shadows in the Sand. 30 degrees south. pp. 293. ISBN 0-620-47480-7.


^ O'Brien 2011, p. 104.

^ a b O'Brien 2011, p. 105.

^ Chesterman 2001, p. 27.

^ Lord 2008, p. 252.

^ Lord 2008, p. 247.

^ TRC-Violations.

^ TRC-1998, p. 70.

^ Hamann 2001, p. 65-65.

^ Wren 1989.

^ Howard 2008, p. 76.

^ CCB-2000.



"Koevoet Member Confesses to Commission". Cape Town: SAPA. 23 July 1997. Retrieved 19 April 2012.

"Sean Mark Callaghan Application for Amnesty". Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South Africa). 29 Jan 2001. Retrieved 19 Arp 2012.

Turner, John W. (1998). Continent Ablaze. The Insurgency Wars in Africa 1960 to the Present. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball. ISBN 1-85409-128-X.

Chesterman, Simon (2001). Civilians in War. Lynne Rienner Publishers. ISBN 1-55587-965-9.

Venter, Al J (1994). The Chopper Boys. Helicopter Warfare in Africa. Gibraltar: Ashanti. ISBN ISBN 1-85367-177-0.

Wren, Christopher S. (October 1, 1989). "South Africa Disbands Special Police in Namibia". New York Times. Retrieved 2007-10-24.

"Targeted by the Civil Cooperation Bureau". Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South Africa). 28 Sep 2000.

Truth and Reconciliation Commission Human Rights Violations Health Sector Hearings (Truth and Reconciliation Commission June 17, 1997). Text

"Namibia: UNTAG Background". United Nations. 2001-06-07.

Howard, Lise Morjé (Spring 2002). "UN Peace Implementation in Namibia: The Causes of Success". International Peacekeeping 9 (1).

Hooper, Jim (1988). Koevoet!. Southern Book Publishers. ISBN 1-86812-167-4.

Howard, Lise Morjé (2008). UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 052188138.

Lord, Dick (2008). From Fledgling To Eagle: The South African Air Force During the Border War. 30° South Publishers. ISBN 1-920143-30-0.

Truth and Reconcilliation Commission of South Africa] (Report). Volume 2. 1998.

Hamann, Hilton (2001). Days of the Generals. Zebra. ISBN 1-86872-340-2.

O'Brien, Kevin A (2011). The South African Intelligence Services: From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 0-415-43397-5.

External links    ( Wikipedia )







  2. This comment has been removed by a blog administrator.

  3. The person who wrote this is totally uneducated and totally misinformed about the workings of Koevoet, this article is so, so far away from the truth.......
    As a example, and I quote,
    "In it 10 year existence, Koevoet fought in 1615 encounters and took 3225 prisoners – the equivalent of almost 6 Battalions of troops!" End of quote......
    Rubbish, untrue and now where close to that figures......
    I honestly suggest the writer of this article take this havnt got a freekin clue you talking about.....

  4. The author seems to not understand that there was regular SAP Coin units stationed in the operational area and they had absolutely nothing to do with Koevoet. Although there were a lot of allegations of brutality and crimes committed by Koevoet very few of them could ever be substantiated and were probably just anti Koevoet propaganda. Where Koevoet members were in fact convicted it was in most cases because Koevoet Unit itself arrested the members and produced evidence against them.
    People who which to sound all educated about the unit might want to talk to real members who served in that unit with pride and get the real facts. It does not help to go talk to some dude who may have seen Koevoet driving by once or even to some fool who was ejected from the unit due to his unsuitability and is now angry like some articles I have come across.
    They may have taken out a battallion of SWAPO fighters over the years and that is what they will be remembered for. Being efficient and deadly to the enemy during a guerilla war does not make you many friends especially amongst conventional forces who are married to outdated ideas which don't work and then due to professional jealousy will say almost anything to denigrate the successes of the non conventional unit.