Bangladesh fishermen kill 10 pirates

Bangladesh fishermen kill 10 pirates
2011-12-15 07:54


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Dhaka - Bangladesh police say fishermen have beaten to death 10 suspected pirates who were wounded in a gunfight with security forces.

Local police chief Bashir Ahmed says the wounded men were being brought to a police station late on Wednesday when hundreds of angry fishermen snatched them from police and beat them to death.

He said on Thursday that police were far outnumbered by the mob and could not save the suspected pirates.

The deaths occurred in southern Bhola district. The area is 104km south of the capital, Dhaka.

Piracy is common along the coast of Bangladesh and fishermen complain that security forces are not doing enough to protect them.



- SAPA

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The Case for Action
For over 2,000 years, the nations of the world have considered pirates to be enemies of the human race (hostes humani generis). Accordingly, every nation has the legal authority to establish jurisdiction over piracy and punish the offenders, regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator or victim.
Piracy in the 21st century is a serious and growing problem. We live in an interdependent and interconnected global society supported by a global economy – and that economy simply cannot function if the world’s oceans are not safe and secure for maritime commerce. Accordingly, the nations of the world must work with international organizations and the shipping industry to confront and repress any persistent piracy threat to global shipping and the freedom of navigation upon which it depends.
Piratical attacks off the Horn of Africa constitute a threat to the lives and welfare of the citizens and seafarers of many nations. Nearly 12% of the world’s petroleum passes through the Gulf of Aden, which is one of the world’s most important waterways. A single piratical attack often affects the interests of numerous countries, including the flag State of the vessel, various States of nationality of the seafarers taken hostage, regional coastal States, owner States, and cargo owner, transshipment, and destination States. Further, such attacks undermine confidence in global sea lines of communication, weaken or undermine the legitimacy of States, threaten the legitimate revenue and resources essential to the building of Somalia, cause a rise in maritime insurance rates and cargo costs, increase the risk of environmental damage, and endanger the lives of seafarers who may be injured, killed, or taken hostage for ransoms.
The National Strategy for Maritime Security (September 2005) (“the Strategy”) declares our vital national interest in maritime security, and recognizes that nations have a common interest in achieving two complementary objectives: to facilitate the vibrant maritime commerce that underpins economic security, and to protect against ocean-related terrorist, hostile, criminal, and dangerous acts, including piracy. In furtherance of this “common interest,” the Strategy mandates “full and complete national and international coordination, cooperation, and intelligence and information sharing among public and private entities … to protect and secure the maritime domain.” The United States’ Policy for the Repression of Piracy and other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea (June 2007) (Annex 1, “the Policy”) provides that we shall “[c]ontinue to lead and support international efforts to repress piracy and other acts of violence against maritime navigation and urge other states to take decisive action both individually and through international efforts.”
Countering Piracy Off Somalia: Partnership & Action Plan
This Plan implements the United States’ national strategy and policy to foster international cooperation and integration among all nations, international organizations, industry and other entities that have an interest in maritime security to ensure the full range of lawful and timely actions necessary to repress piracy off the Horn of Africa.
Overview of the Threat
Piracy off the Horn of Africa is growing in frequency, range, aggression, and severity at an alarming rate. Somali pirates operate along a 2,300-mile coast and in 2.5 million square miles of ocean. Since late 2007, Somali pirates have attacked and harassed vessels transiting up to 450 miles offshore in the Indian Ocean and in the Gulf of Aden, a natural chokepoint providing access to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Somali-based piracy against chemical and oil tankers, freighters, cruise ships, yachts, and fishing vessels poses a threat to global shipping. This combination of illicit activity and non-existent rule of law offers a breeding ground for higher levels of instability, organized crime, and other transnational threats.
Somali pirates operate from well-equipped and well-armed bases ashore along the Indian Ocean coast of Central Somalia and Puntland, from the port towns of Caluula, Eyl, Hobyo, and Haradheere. They depart from these bases typically using four or five pirates in small, lightweight, fiberglass molded skiffs powered by one or more outboard motors and able to attain speeds in excess of 30 knots. These skiffs usually hunt for vulnerable vessels with a low freeboard traveling under 15 knots during daylight.
Once they target a vessel, pirates typically coordinate a two- or three-pronged simultaneous attack from multiple directions. Pirates are typically armed and fire upon their targets with small arms, automatic weapons, and rocket-propelled grenades, which they likely obtain through the constant and largely unimpeded stream of illegal weapons transiting through Somalia in violation of the 1992 United Nations embargo on arms into Somalia (U.N. Security Council Resolution 733 (1992)). Depending on the characteristics and compliance of the victim vessel, pirates can board and commandeer a vessel in less than 20 minutes from the initial attack. If the hijacked vessel is of low ransom value, such as a fishing vessel or cargo dhow, pirates may use it opportunistically as a “mother ship” to launch additional attacks on larger, more lucrative merchant vessels.
In many cases, merchant vessels have been able to fend off pirates or avoid attacks using relatively simple best practices - such as increased surveillance, transiting at night, charging fire hoses, speeding up and evasive maneuvering. In other cases, the pirated vessel has allowed itself to become a victim by stopping. Vessels with low power and low freeboard require additional measures to avoid capture – such as embarked security teams, employing boarding obstacles such as razor wire, and rehearsing lockdown procedures. Although pirates brandish weapons and have fired upon ships, it is contrary to their interest to intentionally harm the
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Countering Piracy Off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan
hostages needed to leverage the maximum ransom, or actually disable the ship because they need it to bring their hostages to the coast near their safe havens ashore.
Ransom payments are the lifeblood of Somali pirates: each ransom paid further emboldens these pirates and perpetuates the threat. Somali pirates have yet to display an interest in stealing cargo or reusing pirated ships for other purposes (other than temporarily as mother ships). Instead, Somali pirates have created highly visible hostage-for-ransom situations. The pirates have brought seized vessels, cargoes, and crews from the high seas into Somali territorial waters near one of their main land bases of operation where they have access to food, water, khat, weapons, ammunition, and other resources during ransom negotiations. Pirates aboard the seized ship negotiate ransoms with the ship’s owner or agent using the ship’s communication equipment. Shipping interests typically pay ransoms in cash ranging from $500,000 to $2 million, with the overall income from piracy ransoms estimated to exceed $30 million in 2008. High profits with low costs and little risk of consequences in a failed and starving State ensure that Somali pirate groups have almost unlimited human resources and do not lack for recruits and support.
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Countering Piracy Off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan
[3] U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8; 18 USC 7(1) (Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States); 18 USC 111 (Assault on Federal Officials); 18 USC 113 (Assault on the high seas); 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy); 18 USC 844(i) (Use of explosive against property used in foreign commerce of the United States or against any property used in an activity affecting foreign commerce of the United States); 18 USC 1651 (Piracy on the high seas); 18 USC 1659 (plundering a ship); 18 USC 2111 (Robbery on high seas); 18 USC 2280(a)(1)(A),(B), and/or (H) (Maritime violence/hijacking of a ship); 18 USC 2232 (Assaults on U.S. nationals overseas); 18 USC 2232a (Use of WMD against U.S. nationals outside of the U.S.)